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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 The principle of the rule of law 
 
Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the ‘Constitution’) states 
that: 
 
‘[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a)  Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b)  Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c)  Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d)  Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters role, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness’. 
 
As the Constitutional Court held in United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic 
of South Africa,1 these values are important because they influence the interpretation of the 
other provisions of the Constitution as well as the ordinary rules of law, and set positive 
standards with which all law must comply in order to be valid. This means that any law or 
conduct which is inconsistent with these values can be declared invalid and struck down.2  
 
Although all of the values set out in section 1 are equally important, over the past twenty 
years, the rule of law and, in particular, the principle of legality, has played a particularly 
significant role in the development of South Africa’s new constitutional system. This is 
because the Constitutional Court has consistently held that the exercise of all public power 
that falls outside the field of administrative action must at the very least comply with the 
principle of legality which is a part of the rule of law. 
 
The rule of law has enjoyed great attention in recent years and has been termed ‘the most 
important political development of the second millennium’.3 It has also been praised for 
promoting development4 and has also been hailed as essential in bringing peace to 
                                                          
1 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC). 
2 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) para 19. 
3 P Johnson ‘Laying Down the Law: Britain and American lead the way in establishing legal regimes based on 
universal principles’ (1999) Wall Street Journal 22. 
4 B Z Tamanaha On the Rule of Law, History and Politics, Theory (2004) 2. 
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transitional and post-conflict states.5 Notwithstanding its growing influence at both a national 
and international level, the principle of the rule of law remains a somewhat elusive notion.6  It 
is so contested a concept7  that Tamanaha gives a caveat on its elusive nature when he says 
that: 
 
‘disagreement exists about what the rule of law means amongst casual users of the phrase, among government 
officials  and among theorists. The danger of this rampant uncertainty is that rule of law might devolve into an 
empty phrase, so lacking in meaning that it can be proclaimed with impunity by malevolent governments’.8 
 
The modern concept of the rule of law may be traced back to the British constitutional law 
scholar, Albert Venn Dicey (1835–1922). In his great study entitled an Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (1895) Dicey argued that the rule of law encompasses 
three principles, namely the principle of the supremacy of the law, the principle of equality 
under the law and a general principle. 
 
The principle of the supremacy of the law, he explains, refers to ‘the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power.’9 This means 
that the ordinary law is supreme and that no one may be deprived of his or her rights through 
the arbitrary exercise of power.10 A person may only be deprived of his or her rights in terms 
of established or pre-existing law.11 
 
The principle of equality under the law, Dicey explains, means that no one, including public 
officials and member of the monarchy, are above the law. Instead, ‘every man, whatever be 
his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’.12 The important role that the ordinary courts play in 
upholding the rule of law is emphasised at this stage.13  
 
                                                          
5 E Brahm ‘Transitional Justice, Civil Society, and the Development of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (2007) 9(4) International Journal of Non-Profit Law available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol9iss4/special_2.htm, accessed 30 May 2014.  
6 B Z Tamanaha On the Rule of Law, History and Politics, Theory (2004) 3. 
7 J Waldron ‘Is the rule of law an essentially contested concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 
137. 
8 B Z Tamanaha On the Rule of Law, History and Politics, Theory (2004) 114. 
9 AV Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution 10ed (1961) 202. 
10 J de Ville ‘The rule of law and judicial review: rereading Dicey’ (2006) The Acta Juridica 79 
11 B Z Tamanaha On the Rule of Law, History and Politics, Theory (2004) 63. 
12 A V Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution 10ed (1961) 193. 
13 A V Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution 10ed (1961) 202. 
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The general principle, Dicey explains, means that the fundamental rights of the individual are 
protected by the ordinary remedies of the common law provided by the ordinary courts, 
rather than by a Constitution.14 The principle of the rule of law, therefore, should be rooted, 
not in written laws (including the Constitution), but rather in judicial decisions. This is 
because it is more difficult for authoritarian regimes to set aside the decisions of the courts 
than it is to set aside the written laws they have made themselves. Accordingly, the growth of 
legislation is not something to be welcomed, but rather regretted.15   
 
Since Dicey first introduced the idea of the rule of law, several different versions have been 
developed. Among these are the minimalist version, the formalist version and the substantive 
version. 
 
As its name suggests, the minimalist version simply provides that the state must act in 
accordance with a valid law regardless of its procedural and substantive qualities. In other 
words, the state may only exercise those powers that have been conferred upon it by the law. 
This version accordingly imposes no limits on the form and administration of laws. It also 
imposes no limits on the substance of laws.16 Provided the government is acting in terms of a 
valid law it is complying with the rule of law, even if those laws are unfair and unjust. This 
version was promoted by the apartheid government. 
 
The formalist version is a more sophisticated version of the rule of law. It adds to the 
minimalist version by imposing important procedural requirements on the state’s authority to 
make and administer laws.17 In particular, this version provides that the law must be general 
in nature; that it must be prospective and not retrospective; that it must be clear, open and 
relatively stable; and that the law must be enforced by independent courts following fair 
                                                          
14 A V Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution 10ed (1961) 203. Bealac argues that this 
principle is not a general one. Instead, it is special and specific to English institutions only (see S Beaulac The 
Rule of Law in International Law Today (2009) at 199 available at 
https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/3093/International-Rule-Law-
Final.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on 14 September 2015).  
15 A V Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution 10ed (1961) iv. 
16 A N Medécigo Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights: Critical Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Review 
in the United States, Germany and Mexico (2015) 15. Medécigo calls this version the instrumental notion of the 
rule of law. 
17 A Street Judicial review and the rule of law. Who is in Control? (2013) 13. 
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procedures. Like the minimalist version, however, this version does not impose any limits on 
the substance of laws.18 
 
The substantive version adds to both the principle of authority version and the principle of 
legality version by imposing substantive limits on the state’s authority to make and 
administer laws.19 In terms of this version, the rule of law is seen as an important mechanism 
for achieving a just society.20 In terms of this version, therefore, the rule of law is associated 
with the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights.21 
 
1.2 The basis of the principle of the rule of law in South Africa 
 
As was pointed out above, the rule of law and the principle of legality have played a 
particularly significant role in the development of South Africa’s new constitutional system. 
This is because the Constitutional Court has consistently held that the exercise of all public 
power that falls outside the field of administrative action must at the very least comply with 
the principle of legality. The rule that the principle of legality functions as a restriction on the 
exercise of public power may be traced back to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in 
Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council.22  
 
The facts of the case are as follows. The Transitional Metropolitan Council and its four 
substructures (the Eastern Metropolitan Substructure, the Northern Metropolitan 
Substructure, the Western Metropolitan Substructure and the Southern Metropolitan 
Substructure) passed resolutions imposing a general rate of 6.45 cents in the rand on all land 
and rights of land under their jurisdiction for the 1996/1997 financial year. One of the 
consequences of adopting this general rate was that some ratepayers would be faced with a 
significant increase in the amount of rates they had to pay, while others would enjoy a 
decrease.  
                                                          
18 A N Medécigo Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights: Critical Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Review 
in the United States, Germany and Mexico (2015) 11-17.    
19 A N Medécigo Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights: Critical Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Review 
in the United States, Germany and Mexico (2015) 15. Medécigo calls this version the material or maximalist 
notion of the rule of law. 
20 A N Medécigo Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights: Critical Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Review 
in the United States, Germany and Mexico (2015) 15. In this respect Medécigo states that substantive rule of law 
calls for intrinsic moral content in the laws.  
21 T Bingham The Rule of Law (2010) 66-67. Lord Bingham referred to the versions as ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ 
definitions. 




After these resolutions were passed, the appellants, who all faced a significant increase in the 
amount of rates they would have to pay, applied to the Johannesburg High Court for an order 
declaring the resolutions to be unconstitutional and invalid on the grounds that they were 
ultra vires and therefore infringed the constitutional right to just administrative action 
guaranteed in section 24(a) of the interim Constitution.23 The Johannesburg High Court 
dismissed the application and the appellants then appealed unsuccessfully to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and then to the Constitutional Court.  
 
Given that the right to just administrative action applies only to those exercises of public 
power (and sometimes private power) that can be classified as administrative action, one of 
the key questions the Court had to answer was whether the resolutions in question could be 
classified as administrative action. The Court held that they could not. In arriving at its 
decision, the Court held that prior to the transition to democracy by-laws made by a 
municipal council were classified as administrative action. This is because municipal councils 
themselves were classified as subordinate law-making bodies.24 
 
Following the enactment of the interim Constitution, however, this was no longer the case. In 
terms of the interim Constitution, by-laws had to be classified as legislative rather than 
administrative action. This is because local governments were not only recognised by the 
interim Constitution, but also derived at least some of their powers directly from the interim 
Constitution. In addition, municipalities were no longer subordinate law-making bodies but 
deliberative legislative bodies whose members were elected. The legislative decisions taken 
by them, therefore, were influenced by political considerations for which they were 
politically accountable to the electorate.25 
 
Although municipal by-laws could not be reviewed for consistency with section 24(a) of the 
interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court held further, they could still be reviewed for 
consistency with the principle of legality which forms a part of the rule of law. The Court 
went further to state that the principle of legality provides, at the very least, that ‘the 
legislature and the executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may 
                                                          
23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (the ‘interim Constitution’). 
24 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 38. 
25 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 41. 
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exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.’26 In 
other words, the Court endorsed the principle of authority, namely that the exercise of all 
power should be sanctioned by law: 
 
‘It seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the legislature and executive in every sphere 
are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred 
upon them by law.  At least in this sense, then, the principle of legality is implied within the terms of the interim 
Constitution.  Whether the principle of the rule of law has greater content than the principle of legality is not 
necessary for us to decide here.  We need merely hold that fundamental to the interim Constitution is a principle 
of legality’.27 
 
An important consequence that flows from this finding, the Constitutional Court went on to 
hold, is that while administrative, legislative and executive actions are subject to the principle 
of authority, the source of this principle differs depending upon the nature of the action in 
question. In the case of administrative action, the principle of authority was enshrined in 
section 24(a) of the interim Constitution, now section 33 of the final Constitution. In the case 
of legislative and executive action, however, the principle of authority was enshrined in the 
principle of legality which was implicit in the interim Constitution itself.28 
 
1.3 The application of the principle of the rule of law in South Africa 
 
From its humble beginnings in the Fedure Life Insurance case, the principle of legality has 
expanded exponentially over the past 15 years and today it consists of a wide range of 
grounds on which legislative, executive and judicial action may be challenged, encompassing 
the minimalist, the formalist and even the substantive versions of the rule of law.  
 
Apart from its judgment in Fedsure Life Insurance, for example, the Constitutional Court 
also applied the minimalist approach in Minister of Education v Harris29 and held that the 
Minister could not impose legally binding obligations on independent schools unless there 
was a law authorising him to do so.  
 
                                                          
26 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
27 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
28 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 59. 
29 Minister of Education v Harris 2001 (4) SA 1297 (CC).  
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A more formal conception of the rule of law was applied in President of the RSA v Hugo,30 
where the Constitutional Court held that the legislature may not enact a law that applies 
retrospectively or that targets a particular individual or group and in Affordable Medicines 
Trust v Minister of Health,31 where the Court held that the legislature may not enact a law 
that is so vague and uncertain that those who are bound but it do not know what is expected 
of them.  
 
The decision to apply a substantive version of the rule of law appears to have originated in 
New National Party v Government of the RSA,32 where the Constitutional Court held that the 
legislature may not enact a law that is arbitrary and irrational and was confirmed most 
famously in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: In re Ex parte Application of the President of 
the RSA,33 where the Court held that the executive may not exercise the powers that have 
been conferred upon it in a manner that is irrational. 
 
Besides holding that the executive may not exercise the powers that have been conferred 
upon it in a manner that is irrational, the Constitutional Court has also applied the substantive 
versions of the rule of law to find that: 
(a) the executive may not exercise the powers that have been conferred upon it in bad 
faith or misconstrue its powers;34  
(b)  the executive must exercise its powers to serve the legitimate purpose of those 
powers: it must not act arbitrarily, for no purpose or with an ulterior motive;35 
(c)  when the executive exercises its powers it may not ignore relevant considerations;36 
and it must act with procedural rationality;37 and 
(d)  the executive must exercise its powers diligently and without undue delay.38 
 
1.4 The principle of the rule of law and the right to procedural fairness 
                                                          
30 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
31 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 108. See also Dawood v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 102.  
32 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) and Merafong 
Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC). 
33 Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) and Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the RSA 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC). 
34 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
35 Gauteng Gambling Board & another v MEC for Economic Development, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2012 (5) SA 24 (SCA). 
36 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
37 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). 




As Hoexter points out a careful examination of the grounds of review encompassed by the 
rule of law overlap in many respect with the grounds of review encompassed by the right to 
just administrative action guaranteed in section 33 of the Constitution and that the 
Constitutional Court is simply using the principles of administrative law under another 
name.39  
 
Although Hoexter is quite correct when she states that the grounds of review under the rule of 
law and the right to just administrative action overlap in many respects, it is important to note 
that there are certain important respects in which they do not overlap. One of the most 
important of these is the right to procedural fairness, particularly with respect to executive 
action. 
 
When it comes to reviewing executive action on the grounds that it is procedurally unfair, the 
Constitutional Court has adopted different approaches. Initially the Court adopted a strict 
approach. In its majority judgment in Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 
(‘Masetlha’)40 and unanimous judgment in Association of Regional Magistrates of South 
Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa (‘ARMSA’)41 the Court held that executive 
action cannot be reviewed on the grounds that it is procedurally unfair. Or, to put it another 
way, in these cases the Court held that the right to procedural fairness should not be included 
as a separate and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the principle of 
legality.  
 
Following its majority judgment in Masetlha and unanimous judgment in ARMSA, however, 
the Constitutional Court began to move towards a broader approach. This move started in 
Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (‘Albutt’),42 where the Court 
held that executive action may be reviewed and set aside in those cases where the failure to 
follow a fair procedure was irrational and confirmed in Democratic Alliance v President of 
                                                          
39 C Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in South African administrative law’ 2000 (117) SALJ 482 506. See 
also J Klaaren ‘Redlight, Greenlight: Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council; Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, 
Eastern Transvaal’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 209 212. 
40 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
41 Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (7) 
BCLR 762 (CC). 
42 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). 
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the Republic of South Africa (‘Democratic Alliance’),43 where the Court held that executive 
action may be reviewed and set aside in those cases where not only the decision, but also the 
process that preceded the decision was irrational. 
  
More recently, the Constitutional Court has moved even close towards adopting a broad 
approach. In Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau (‘Motau’),44 the 
Constitutional Court unanimously suggested, in an obiter dictum, that executive action could 
in fact be reviewed on the grounds that it is procedurally unfair. Or, to put it another way, the 
Court suggested, in an obiter dictum, that the right to procedural fairness should be included 
as a separate and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the principle of 
legality.  
 
In light of these judgments, the purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the different 
approaches the Constitutional Court has adopted towards procedural fairness as a separate 
and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the principle of legality, and to 
consider the implications that these different approaches have for the doctrine of the 
separation of powers and, in particular, the separation of functions between the courts, on the 
one hand, and the executive and the legislature, on the other. 
 
1.5 The research question 
 
As pointed out above, the purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the different 
approaches the Constitutional Court has adopted towards procedural fairness as a separate 
and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the rule of law, and the 
implications that these different approaches have for the doctrine of the separation of powers.  
 
More particularly, the purpose of this thesis is to: 
(a)  set out and discuss what is meant by the right to procedural fairness; 
(b)  set out and discuss the different approaches the Constitutional Court has adopted 
towards procedural fairness as a separate and self-standing ground of review under the 
principle of legality; 
                                                          
43 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
44 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
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(c)  set out and discuss the implications of the different approaches that the Constitutional 
Court has adopted for the doctrine of the separation of powers and, in particular, the 
separation of functions between the courts, on the one hand, and the executive and the 
legislature, on the other. 
 
1.6 The theoretical framework 
 
The thesis is based on the theory of transformative constitutionalism. The Constitution is 
basically the source of this theory.45 It is a legal instrument for progressive and 
transformative development of the law.46 The Constitution contains normative values which 
seek to ‘transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality’.47 These values are contained in the Bill of rights which for all intents and purposes 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, all organs of state, and, where applicable, a 
natural or juristic person.48  
 
Transformative constitutionalism accepts that ‘the achievement of political and socio-
economic transformation requires a “collaborative enterprise” of all state players.’49 As an 
instrument of transformation, the Constitution fosters a ‘culture of justification that all public 
power should be kept in balance by checking for compliance with human rights standards.’50 
This theory is relevant because it is adaptive and more accommodating of the different and 
changing social, economic, political and historical context of South Africa.51  
 
1.7 The research methodology 
 
This is a qualitative study. As such, it is based largely on a critical analysis of primary and 
secondary legal resources and materials in order to identify contradictions, inconsistencies, 
lacunae and trends in the relevant field. The primary and secondary materials that will be 
                                                          
45 K E Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146. 
46 R Solange “Transformative Constitutionalism in a Democratic Developmental State’ 2011 (22) 3 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 542 565. 
47 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 8. 
48 Constitution: Section 8. 
49 R Solange ‘Transformative Constitutionalism in a Democratic Developmental State’ 2011 (22) 3 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 542 545. 
50 E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 32 in R Solange 
“Transformative Constitutionalism in a Democratic Developmental State’ 2011(22) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 
542 545. 
51 S Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAHRJ 146 at 188. 
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analysed in this study include statutes and law reports. In addition, they also include books, 
chapters in books, journal articles, reports and internet websites.  
 
1.8 The limitations of the study 
 
Although the rule of law applies to legislative, executive and judicial action, this thesis 
focuses on procedural fairness as a separate and self-standing ground of review for executive 
action only. As Murcott has pointed out, it is not necessary to consider whether procedural 
fairness should also be a separate and self-standing ground of review for legislative and 
judicial actions. This is because the Constitution itself provides that Parliament, the 
provincial legislatures and the municipal councils must facilitate public involvement when 
they exercise their legislative and other powers52 and because judicial proceedings already 
take place in public and in the presence of independent and impartial decision-makers.53  
 
1.9 The structure of the study 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The aims and objectives of the study are set out in Chapter One. Apart from the aims and 
objects, the sources of the principle of the rule of law, the basis and application of the 
principle of the rule of law in South Africa and the relationship between the principle of the 
rule of law and the right to procedural fairness are also set out in Chapter One. Chapter One 
also includes the research question, the theoretical framework of the study, the research 
methodology, the limitations of the study and the structure of the study. 
 
Chapter Two: The right to procedural fairness 
 
The history and sources of the right to procedural fairness is set out in Chapter Two. Apart 
from the history and sources, the value of the right to procedural fairness as well as the scope 
and ambit of the right to procedural fairness are set out in Chapter Two. Chapter Two also 
                                                          
52 Section 59 and 72. 




includes a discussion of the audi alteram partem principle and the nemo judex in sua causa 
principle. 
 
Chapter Three: The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
 
The extent to which the Constitutional Court has recognised procedural fairness as a separate 
and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the principle of legality is set 
out and critically discussed in Chapter Three. This discussion takes place in the context of a 
careful examination of the judgments in Masetlha, ARMSA, Albutt, Democratic Alliance and 
Motau. 
 
Chapter Four: The doctrine of the separation of powers 
 
The origins of the doctrine of separation of powers, the elements that make up the doctrine 
and the principle of checks and balances are set out and discussed in Chapter Four. Apart 
from the origin, the elements and the principle of checks and balances, the application of the 
doctrine in South Africa both pre- and post-1994 is also discussed in Chapter Four. This 
Chapter also includes a discussion of the power of judicial review as an element of the 
principle of checks and balances and the manner in which the Constitutional Court has 
attempted to exercise this power without overstepping the limits of its authority. 
 
Chapter Five: Comment and Analysis 
 
The Chapter will then take a critical view on the way the Court has dealt with the adoption of 
procedural fairness as a part of legality. It is in this chapter that the position of the Court is 
measured against the principles of the separation of powers. Also in this chapter we shall 
determine the viability of the Court’s position in light of the separation of powers. We will 
also give recommendations to the Court on whether to continue on the same course, divert, or 












As we have already seen, the grounds of review encompassed by the rule of law overlap in 
many respects with the grounds of review encompassed by the right to just administrative 
action, with some important exceptions. One of these exceptions is the right to procedural 
fairness. The purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss the scope and ambit of the right 
to procedural fairness. Although the right to procedural fairness plays an important role in 
many different branches of the law, the branch in which it plays the most significant role is 
administrative law. The scope and ambit of the right to procedural fairness, therefore, will be 
set out and discussed from an administrative law perspective, taking into account the 
common law, the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the 
‘PAJA’).54 
 
2.2 The history and sources of procedural fairness 
 
The three main sources of the right to procedural fairness are the common law, the 
Constitution and the PAJA. Although the Constitution and especially the PAJA are the 
primary sources of the right to procedural fairness to today, the common law still has an 
important role to play. The role that the common law plays in this branch of the law today 
was illustrated in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex 
parte President of the Republic of South Africa,55 where the Constitutional Court held that 
administrative law: 
 
‘. . . is built on constitutional principles which define the authority of each branch of government, their inter-
relationship and the boundaries between them. Prior to the coming into force of the interim Constitution, the 
common law was the main crucible for the development of these principles of constitutional law.71 The Interim 
Constitution which came into force in April 1994 was a legal watershed. It shifted constitutionalism, and with it 
all aspects of public law, from the realm of common law to the prescripts of a written constitution which is the 
supreme law. That is not to say that the principles of common law have ceased to be material to the development 
of public law. These well-established principles will continue to inform the content of administrative law and 
other aspects of public law, and will contribute to their future development. But there has been a fundamental 
                                                          
54 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
55 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2002 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
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change. Courts no longer have to claim space and push boundaries to find means of controlling public power. 
That control is vested in them under the Constitution which defines the role of the courts, their powers in 
relation to other arms of government, and the constraints subject to which public power has to be exercised. 
Whereas previously constitutional law formed part of and was developed consistently with the common law, the 
roles have been reversed. The written Constitution articulates and gives effect to the governing principles of 
constitutional law. Even if the common law constitutional principles continue to have application in matters not 
expressly dealt with by the Constitution, (and that need not be decided in this case) the Constitution is the 
supreme law and the common law, in so far as it has any application, must be developed consistently with it, and 
subject to constitutional control’.56 
 
As this rather lengthy quote indicates, the key role of the common law rules and principles 
governing the right to procedural fairness is to inform the content of the section 33 of the 
Constitution and especially the provisions of the PAJA and to contribute to their future 
development.57 Other words, the rules of procedural fairness were derived from the rules of 
natural justice as demonstrated in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century English cases.58   
 
For most of the twentieth century the common law rules and principles governing the right to 
procedural fairness adopted a very narrow approach. In terms of this narrow approach, the 
courts held that a decision was fair simply if it complied with the rules of natural justice.59 
These rules were encapsulated in two Latin maxims, namely audi alteram partem (hear the 
other side) and nemo iudex in sua causa esse debet principle (no one should be a judge in 
their own case).60  
 
Besides restricting the right to procedural fairness to the rules of natural justice, during most 
of the twentieth century the courts also held that these rules applied only in those cases in 
which a decision could be classified as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and not to those 
cases in which a decision could be classified as legislative or purely administrative in nature, 
                                                          
56 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2002 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 45. 
57 R S French Personnel Security Procedural Fairness Guidelines (2010) available at 
http://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/personnelsecurity/Documents/Procedural%20fairness%20guidelines.pdf, 
accessed on 20 April 2015. French states that ‘although some have indicated that the term natural justice and 
procedural fairness can be used interchangeably, we shall prefer the term procedural fairness because the term 
natural justice is associated more with the decision making by the judges in the courts of law’.57 
58 R S French Personnel Security Procedural Fairness Guidelines (2010) 3 available at 
http://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/personnelsecurity/Documents/Procedural%20fairness%20guidelines.pdf, 
accessed on 20 April 2015. 
59 M Groves ‘Exclusion of the Rules of Natural Justice’ (2013) 39(2) Monash University Law Review 285.  
60 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Law in South Africa (2003) 218. 
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in the absence of legislation to the contrary.61In addition, the courts held that a decision could 
only be classified as quasi-judicial if it prejudicially affected a person’s rights. An important 
consequence of this approach is that a person who was merely an applicant and who did not 
have a right to claim what he or she was applying for was not protected by the audi 
principle.62 
 
This narrow approach began to change in the late 1980s when the courts adopted a broader 
and more flexible approach to procedural fairness culminating in the judgment in 
Administrator of the Transvaal v Traub.63 In this case, the Appellate Division (as it then was) 
rejected the classification of decisions as judicial or quasi-judicial, on the one hand, and 
legislative or purely administrative, on the other. The classification of a decision as quasi-
judicial, the Court held, ‘adds nothing to the process of reasoning: the Court could just as 
well eliminate this step and proceed straight to the question as to whether the decision does 
prejudicially affect the individual concerned’.64 
 
This new approach gained some momentum when the interim Constitution came into 
operation.65 This is because section 24 of the interim Constitution provided, inter alia, that 
‘everyone shall have to the right to procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or 
her rights or legitimate expectations is affected or threatened’. While this provision still 
restricted the application of the right to procedural fairness to those cases in which a person’s 
rights were prejudicially affected by a decision, it also confirmed the fact that the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations now formed a part of South African law.  
 
These limitations on the scope and ambit of the right to procedural fairness were 
subsequently abandoned when the Constitution came into operation. This is because section 
33 of the Constitution simply provides, inter alia, that everyone has the right to 
                                                          
61 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 391. 
62 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 391-92. 
63 Administrator of the Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
64 Administrator of the Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 763H-I. Apart from rejecting the classification 
of decisions as the basis for deciding whether the rules of natural justice applied, the judgment in Traub also 
accepted that the doctrine of legitimate expectations formed a part of South African common law (see C Hoexter 
Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 355). 
65 The interim Constitution came into operation on 27 April 1994. This was the date on which the first 
democratic election took place. 
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administrative action that is ‘lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’.66 Besides extending 
the right to procedural fairness beyond the rules of natural justice, both section 24 of the 
interim Constitution and section 33 of the Constitution have elevated the right to procedural 
fairness to the status of a fundamental human right. This means that the application of this 
right cannot be limited by the legislature unless such a limitation satisfies the requirements of 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
In order to fulfil the obligations contained in section 33(3) of the Constitution, Parliament 
enacted the PAJA.67 The Act explicitly provides that procedural fairness is one of the grounds 
on which administrative action may be reviewed.68 This means that every exercise of power 
which falls into the definition of administrative action must now comply with the right to 
procedural fairness. Besides subjecting every administrative act to the right to procedural 
fairness, the PAJA also sets out the requirements of procedural fairness in some detail. In this 
respect it distinguishes between those cases in which administrative action affects an 
individual69 and those cases in which it affects the general public.70 
 
2.3 The value of procedural fairness 
 
The fact that the right to procedural fairness was included in both the interim Constitution 
and the Constitution highlights the important role this right plays in a democratic society. The 
important role that procedural fairness plays in a democratic society has been discussed by 
the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions.  
 
In Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO,71 for example, the 
Constitutional Court held that procedural fairness is important in a democracy because it is 
likely to improve the quality and wisdom of decision-making. 
 
‘In modern states it has become more and more common to grant far-reaching powers to administrative 
functionaries. The safeguards provided by the rules of procedural fairness are thus all the more important. . .. 
                                                          
66 Section 33(1) of the Constitution does not qualify that the right to be heard should be afforded where rights or 
legitimate expectations are affected.  
67 Section 33(3) of the Constitution provides that: ‘National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these 
rights’.  
68 PAJA: Section 6(2)(c). 
69 PAJA: Section 3. 
70 PAJA: Section 4. 
71 Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC). 
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Observance of the rules of procedural fairness ensures that an administrative functionary has an open mind and a 
complete picture of the facts and circumstances within which the administrative action is to be taken. In that 
way the functionary is more likely to apply his or her mind to the matter in a fair and regular manner’.72 
 
And in Joseph v City of Johannesburg¸73 the Constitutional Court, referring to Hoexter, held 
that procedural fairness is important in a democratic society not only because it is likely to 
improve the quality and wisdom of decision-making, but also because it demonstrates respect 
for the dignity of participants. 
 
‘The importance of procedural fairness is well described by Hoexter: “Procedural fairness . . . is concerned with 
giving people an opportunity to participate in the decisions that will affect them, and – crucially – a chance of 
influencing the outcome of those decisions. Such participation is a safeguard that not only signals respect for the 
dignity and worth of participants, but is also likely to improve the quality and rationality of administrative 
decision-making and to enhance its legitimacy”.’74 
 
Apart from the reasons referred to above, procedural fairness also plays an important role in 
our democracy because it promotes some of the values that underlie the Constitution, 
including accountability, responsiveness and openness. In addition, it also promotes the value 
of public participation.  
 
Procedural fairness also has the ability to legitimise government actions as Baxter states that 
whenever the power of government seems to have grown tremendously and more radical, it is 
only fair procedure that will render them tolerable.75  
 
Furthermore, procedural fairness is respected for its intrinsic value. Summers states that how 
good a legal system is may be judged by how good its process is outside the good that may 
arise from it.76 Rawls adds on the same point stating that there is no criterion to distinguish 
                                                          
72 Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC).para 24. 
73 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
74 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 41. In De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) 
at para 131, Mokgoro J held that “[e]veryone has the right to state his or her own case, not because his or her 
version is right, and must be accepted, but because in evaluating the cogency of any argument, the arbiter, still a 
fallible human being, must be informed about the points of view of both parties in order to stand any real chance 
of coming up with an objectively justifiable conclusion that is anything more than chance”.  
75 Baxter Administrative law 1984 at 540. 
76 R S Summers ‘Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes: A Plea for Process Values’ (1974) 60 Cornell Law 
Review 1 2. 
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whether the outcome is just except the procedure itself.77 This means that there is value in the 
process itself outside the final result and this also needs to be protected. 78 
 
It is, however, also important to note that procedural fairness has the potential to impose an 
onerous administrative and financial burdens on the state and in extreme cases can even lead 
to ‘administrative paralysis’. The dangers inherent in the right to procedural fairness were 
highlighted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Premier, Province of Mpumalanga 
v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools; 
Eastern Transvaal79 where the Court said the following: 
 
‘In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a court should be slow to impose 
obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy effectively (a principle 
well recognised in our common law and that of other countries).  As a young democracy facing immense 
challenges of transformation, we cannot deny the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the executive to 
act efficiently and promptly’.80 
 
As such, where the law demands the application of the right to be heard in the exercise of 
public functions and the decision maker does not take heed, it is within the power of the 
courts to rescind the decision or declare it invalid, void and unenforceable.81  Decisions that 
lack procedural fairness are invalid no matter how good the merits of the case are.82 We turn 
then to discuss what procedural fairness encompasses.  
 
2.4 The scope and ambit of procedural fairness 
 
The scope and ambit of the right to procedural fairness may be found in the principles and 
rules of the common law principles, the Constitutional and the PAJA. The common law rules 
                                                          
77 J Rawls A Theory of Justice (1972) 122. 
78 M Bernatt ‘The principle of procedural fairness and its implementation in administrative proceedings: 
Perspective of a country in democratic transition’ (2010) Paper for the Workshop on Constitutional Principles 
and Democratic Transition 4 available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/16/280.pdf, accessed 
24 July 2015. 
79 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-
Aided Schools; Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC). 
80 Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-
Aided Schools; Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) para 41. 
81 Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) 37C-F. See also Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 165. 
82 Traub v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (1) SA 397 (W) para 403D-E. in this case Goldstone J stated that ‘if a 
person is wrongly denied a hearing in a case where he should have been given one, no matter how strong the 
case against him, the denial of the hearing is a fatal irregularity’ 
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of natural justice, however, lie at the heart of the right to procedural fairness even under the 
Constitution and the PAJA. As we have already seen, the rules of natural justice are 
encapsulated in the audi alteram partem principle and the nemo iudex in sua causa principle. 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, we will concentrate on the audi alteram partem 
principle.  
  




As De Ville points out, in its classic form the audi alteram partem principle simply provides 
that a person should be given the opportunity to be heard before a decision that adversely 
affects him or her is made.83 A classic formulation of the principle was referred to with 
approval by the Appellate Division (as it then was) in its judgment in Administrator 
Transvaal v Traub,84 where it held that: 
 
‘The classic formulations of the principle states that when a statute empowers a public official or body to give a 
decision prejudicially affecting an individual in his liberty or property or existing rights, the latter has a right to 
be heard before the decision is taken’.85 
 
The quotes simply enforces that every man deserves to be heard before he is condemned. 86 
The ‘fair hearing’ which lies at the heart of the audi alteram partem principle is made up of a 
number of core components or requirements. Among these are ‘adequate notice of the 
hearing’, ‘a reasonable opportunity to make representations’ and ‘notice of any right of 
review or internal appeal’.87 All of these core requirements, plus several others, have been 
included in sections 3 and 4 of PAJA.  
 
Before turning to consider sections 3 and 4 of PAJA, however, it is important to note that 
even though these core requirements are sometimes regarded as mandatory requirements, 
                                                          
83 JR de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Law in South Africa (2003) 218.  
84 Administrator Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
85 Administrator Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 732A. See also Cabinet for the Territory of South West 
Africa v Chikane and Another 1989 (1) SA 349 (A) 379G. 
86 R v Gaskin 1799 (8) TR 209 210. 
87 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 369-378. 
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they do not in fact have to be applied in every case.88 This is because the audi alteram partem 
principle is a flexible concept.  
 
2.5.2 A flexible concept 
 
As was pointed out above, the audi alteram partem principle is a flexible concept.89 
Essentially, this means that when it comes to deciding whether a hearing was fair or not, the 
courts will always take the particular circumstances of the case into account. An important 
consequence of this approach is that the courts have refused to lay down fixed or rigid rules 
when it comes to determining the meaning and content of the core requirements that make up 
the principle. It is, therefore, not possible to say what ‘adequate notice’ or ‘a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations’ or ‘notice of a right of review or internal appeal’ means 
in the abstract. Instead, the meaning of these core requirements must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.90 
 
Apart from refusing to lay down fixed rules when it comes to determining the meaning of the 
core requirements that make up the audi alteram partem principle, the courts have also been 
careful not to equate administrative processes with courts of law. Administrative processes, 
therefore, do not have to comply with the strict procedures that are followed by courts of law. 
As Hoexter points out, an important consequence of this approach is that the technical rules 
of civil procedure and evidence do not need to be applied in administrative processes.91 
Instead, the courts have allowed administrative functionaries to determine their own 
procedures, provided those procedures are fair.92 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the flexible nature of the audi alteram partem principle is 
recognised in section 3(2)(a) of PAJA, which provides that ‘[a] fair administrative procedure 
depends on the circumstances of each case’.  
 
2.5.3 The requirements of a fair hearing 
 
                                                          
88 M Murcott ‘Procedural Fairness’ in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An introduction 
(2015) 154. 
89 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 364-365. Hoexter calls it a variable concept. 
90 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 364-365. 
91 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 366. 
92 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 366. 
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The requirements for a fair hearing are set out in section 3 and section 4 of the PAJA. Section 
3 sets out the requirements for a fair hearing in those cases in which the administrative action 
in question affects an individual and section 4 set out the requirements for a fair hearing in 
those cases in which the administrative action affects the public at large. For the purposes of 
this thesis, we will discuss largely on section 3 of PAJA. 
 
2.5.4 Section 3 of the PAJA 
 
Section 3 begins by setting out the circumstances in which a person is entitled to a fair 
hearing. Section 3(1) provides in this respect that ‘[a]dministrative action which materially 
and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally 
fair’.  
 
After setting out the circumstances in which a person is entitled to a fair hearing, section 3 
then goes on to set out the requirement for a fair hearing. In this respect it distinguishes 
between those requirements for a fair hearing which appear to be mandatory and those which 
are discretionary.93 The apparently mandatory requirements are set out in section 3(2)(b) and 
the discretionary requirements are set out in section 3(3). 
 
Section 3(2)(b) provides in this respect as follows: 
 
‘In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, subject to 
subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1): 
(i)  adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; 
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(iii)  a clear statement of the administrative action;  
(iv)  adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and 
(v)  adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.’ 
 
Section 3(3) provides in this respect as follows: 
 
                                                          
93 In Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that even though the 
requirements set out in section 3(2)(b) appear to be mandatory, they are not. This is because section 3(2)(b) 
must be read together with section 39(2)(a) which provides that a fair administrative procedure depends on the 
circumstances of each case . 
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‘In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator may, in his or her 
discretion, also give a person referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity to: 
(a)  obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 
(b)  present and dispute information and arguments; and 
(c)  appear in person’. 
 
Although the requirements set out in section 3(2)(b) appear to be mandatory, in Joseph v City 
Council of Johannesburg94 the Constitutional Court held that this is not in fact the case. 
Instead, the courts have a discretion when it comes to enforcing the requirements set out in 
section 3(2)(b). This is because, the Court held further, section 3(2)(b) must be read together 
with section 3(2)(a) which confirms that procedural fairness is a flexible concept which 
‘depends on the circumstances of each case’.95  
 




A careful examination of section 3(1) of PAJA shows that a person is entitled to a fair 
hearing when administrative action has (i) materially or adversely affected (ii) his or her 
rights; or (iii) his or her legitimate expectations. Each of these requirements will be discussed 
in turn 
 
(b) Materially and adversely affect  
 
This requirement appears to adopt a very strict approach towards the circumstances in which 
a person can claim the right to a fair hearing. This is because it seems to limit the 
circumstances in which a person may claim the right to a fair hearing to those cases in which 
the administrative action in question has had a ‘material’ impact on his or her rights or 
legitimate expectations. This narrow approach, however, has been rejected by the 
Constitutional Court in its judgment in Joseph v City of Johannesburg.96 
 
                                                          
94 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
95 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) paras 57-59. 
96 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
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In this case the applicants lived in the same apartment building. The City cut of the supply of 
electricity to the apartment building after the owner failed to pay his account. The applicants 
then applied for an order declaring the City’s decision to be invalid on the grounds that while 
it gave the owner a fair hearing it did not give them a fair hearing. In response the City 
argued that it did not have to give the applicants a fair hearing because it did not have a 
contract to supply electricity with them. It only had a contract with the owner. 
 
One of the issues the Constitutional Court had to decide was whether the City’s decision 
materially and adversely affected any of the applicant’s rights. The Court held that it did. In 
arriving at this conclusion the Court held that administrative action will materially affect a 
person’s rights or legitimate expectations if it simply has a ‘significant and not trivial effect’. 
The key question, therefore, is whether the administrative action affects the person’s rights or 
legitimate expectations.97 
 
(c) Materially and adversely affects a person’s rights 
 
Apart from adopting a generous approach towards the ‘materially and adversely affects’ 
requirement in section 3(1) of the PAJA, the Constitutional Court also adopted a generous 
approach to the ‘rights’ requirement in its judgment in Joseph v City of Johannesburg.98 As 
we have seen, the City argued that it did not have to give the applicants a fair hearing because 
it did not have a contract with them. It only had a contract with the owner. This meant, the 
City argued further, that the applicants had no rights that they could enforce against the City 
and, accordingly, no rights which the City could have materially and adversely affected when 
it made its decision to cut off the supply of electricity. 
 
The Constitutional Court rejected this argument and found that the applicants did have a right 
which they could enforce against the City and that the City had materially and adversely 
affected this right when it cut off the supply of electricity. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court held that the word ‘rights’ in section 3(1) of PAJA does not only encompass common 
law rights that have vested in a person, but also ‘legal entitlements that have their basis in the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of government’.99 This is because the purpose of 
                                                          
97 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 30. 
98 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
99 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 43. 
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PAJA is not simply to protect private law rights, but rather to ‘promote an efficient 
administration and good governance’ and ‘to create a culture of accountability, openness and 
transparency in public administration’.100 
 
After making these points, the Constitutional Court went on to find that the Constitution did 
confer a right on the applicants to receive electricity from the City as a part of the City’s 
obligation to provide basic services to its residents in terms of section 152 of the Constitution. 
The applicants, therefore, did have a constitutional right that they could enforce against the 
City and when the City cut-off the supply of electricity it materially and adversely affected 
this constitutional right.101 
 
(d) Materially and adversely affects a person’s legitimate expectations 
 
Besides those cases in which administrative action has materially and adversely affected a 
person’s rights, a person is also entitled to a fair hearing in those cases in which 
administrative action has materially and adversely affected his or her legitimate expectations. 
The inclusion of the concept of legitimate expectations in section 3(1) of PAJA has 
significantly broadened the circumstances in which a person may claim the right to a fair 
hearing. 
 
As Murcott has pointed out, ‘[a] legitimate expectation is something less than a right. It 
entails the expectation of a fair procedure being followed or of a certain outcome being 
afforded the expectant party’. This expectation, she points out further, must have a reasonable 
basis and must have arisen out of an undertaking given by the administrator or out of a 
practice that has been followed by the administrator for a long period of time.102 
 
The requirements for a legitimate expectation were set out by the High Court in its judgment 
in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips.103 In this case, the Court held that not 
every expectation is protected by the law. Instead, the law only protects those expectations 
                                                          
100 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 43. 
101 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 47. 
102 M Murcott ‘Procedural Fairness’ in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An introduction 
(2015) 151. 
103 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 60 (W). 
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that are legitimate. In order to be considered legitimate, the Court held further, an expectation 
must satisfy the following requirements: 
 First, the representation giving rise to the expectation must be “clear, unambiguous 
and devoid of relevant qualification. 
 Second, the representation giving rise the expectation ‘must have been induced by the 
decision-maker’. 
 Third, the representation giving rise to the expectation must be “one which it was 
competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make. 
 Last, the expectation must be reasonable.104 
 




Having set out the circumstances in which a person is entitled to a fair hearing, we may now 
turn to consider the requirements of a fair hearing. As we have already seen, section 3 of 
PAJA distinguishes between those requirements which are set out in section 3(2)(b) (the 
‘minimum requirements’) and those which are set out in section 3(3) (the ‘discretionary 
requirements’).  
 
(b) The section 3(2)(b) minimum requirements 
 
As we have seen, section 3(2)(b) provides that a hearing will only be fair if the adversely 
affected person is given:  
 adequate notice (s 3(2)(b)(i));  
 a reasonable opportunity to make representations (s 3(2)(b)(ii));  
 a clear statement of the administrative action (s 3(2)(b)(iii)); and  
 notice of any right of review or internal appeal and of the right to request reasons (s 
3(2)(b)(iv) and (v)).  
 
The first of these requirements is based on the argument that a ‘man cannot meet charges for 
which he has no knowledge’. It is, therefore, essential to give an adversely affected person 
                                                          
104 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) para 28. 
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notice of an action that is impending against him or her.105 As section 3(2)(b)(i) explicitly 
states, the notice must contain information about the nature and purpose of the administrative 
action being proposed. In addition, it has been argued that this information must be set out in 
enough detail to enable the adversely affected individual to exercise their rights.106 In this 
respect it has also been held that the information must be so clear that the adversely affected 
individual is left with no questions as to the nature of the specific administrative action in 
question.107 
 
Apart from providing the adversely affected person with sufficient information about the 
nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action, the administrator must also give 
him or her an adequate amount of time to prepare before the hearing takes place.108 In 
practice, the amount of time that will be adequate depends on the circumstances of each 
case.109 In order to determine whether the notice was adequate, the courts will also take into 
account the manner in which the notice was given110 and how understandable the notice is.111 
As Hoexter points out there is also a crucial link between the ‘the amount of information 
disclosed to an affected person and the quality of his or her opportunity to make 
representations’.112 The more valuable the information that is given is, the better the party 
will be better prepared to make their representations. 
 
Besides giving the adversely affected individual adequate notice of the proposed 
administrative action, section 3(2)(b)(ii) provides that he or she must also be given ‘a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations’. This is the second requirement of 
procedural fairness. The obligation set out in section 3(2)(b)(ii) must be read together with 
section 3(3)(c) which provides that an administrator may, in his or her discretion, give an 
adversely affected individual an ‘opportunity to appear in person’. When read together, these 
two sections suggest that a hearing does not always need to be oral in order for it to be fair.113 
There is no right to an oral hearing so, what passes for procedural fairness does not always 
                                                          
105 Kadalie v Hemsworth NO 1928 TPD 495 506. 
106 I Currie & J Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Bench book 2001 para 3.12  and 3.13 
107  Klein v Dainfen College 2006 (3) SA 73 (T) para 35. 
108 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 333. 
109 Nkomo v Administrator, Natal 1991 12 ILJ (N) 48hrs was held to be inadequate but in the Police and Prisons 
Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services 2oo6 2 All SA 175 it was held to be sufficient. 
110 Bashula v Permanent  Secretary , Department of Welfare Eastern Cape 2000 (2) SA 849 (E). Here the nature 
of the proposed action meant that individual notice was sufficient and not a general one. 
111 Cape Killerney Property Investments (Pty (Ltd) v Muhamba 2000 (2) SA 67 (C). 
112 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 334. 
113 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 334. 
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involve an oral hearing.114 Instead of being oral, the representations can instead be submitted 
in a written form, provided they satisfy the requirements of a reasonable opportunity.115 This 
is also true after considering that what is fair is contextual and can differ with circumstances. 
 
It is important to note that the opportunity to make representations can be influenced by the 
following factors: 
 How well the adversely affected individual is apprised of the facts, information and 
reasons that underlie the decision about to be taken. Information has to be material to 
the case.116 
 The disclosure by the administrator of any information that is adverse or prejudicial to 
the adversely affected individual.117 Such disclosure includes the disclosure of 
significant policy considerations.118 
 Whether the adversely affected individual can invoke section 32(2) of the 
Constitution which entitles the applicant the right to full discovery of documentary 
evidence against themselves.119 
 
Another aspect of the opportunity to make representations requirement that needs attention is 
whether the decision-maker is obliged to hear the adversely affected individual’s 
representations personally. In Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,120 the Court held that the obligation to hear 
representations from adversely affected individuals may be delegated to another person.  
 
This case dealt with the construction of a nuclear reactor. The panel that was tasked to hear 
the applicant’s submission was a panel of experts and it was found inconceivable that the 
Director-General should hear the representations considering their technical nature. The 
                                                          
114 Premier, Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided, Eastern Transvaal 
1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) para 39. 
115 I Currie & J Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook 2001 para 3.10 suggests 
fairness would not be met by expecting an uneducated person to give a written submission whilst they could 
have been heard orally.  
116 Earthlife  Africa (Cape Town) v Director General : Department of  Environmental Affairs  and Tourism  
2005 (3) SA 156 (C). 
117 Du Bois v Stompdrift-Kamanassie Besproeiingsraad 2002 (5) SA 186 (C). In this case Griesel J found it 
unfair that the administrator did not disclose two reports prejudicial to the applicant. 
118 Tseleng v Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board 1995(3) SA 162 (T). 
119 NISEC v Western Cape Provincial Tender Board 1997 (3) BCLR 367 (C). 
120 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director General : Department of  Environmental Affairs  and Tourism 2005 
(3) SA 156 (C).  
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experts would assist the Director General to understand the submissions and ensure an 
informed decision on whether to erect the nuclear reactor and this would be in line with 
principles of a fair hearing.121  
 
What is required in the end is that the decision-maker’s conclusion be influenced by the 
submissions made by the applicant. This will promote fairness in the decision made even 
where the decision maker did not hear the applicant’s case personally. 
 
The third requirement of procedural fairness is set out in section 3(2)(b)(iv) which provides 
that an adversely affected individual must be given notice of any right of review or internal 
appeal, where applicable and the four ingredient in section 3(2)(b)(v) which provides that an 
adversely affected individual must be given notice of the right to request reasons in terms of 
section 5 of PAJA. 
 
(c) The section 3(3) discretionary requirements 
 
Apart from the minimum requirements set out in section 3(2)(b), section 3(3) of PAJA 
provides that an administrator may, in his or her discretion, also give an adversely affected 
person an opportunity to:122 
 obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 
 present and dispute information and arguments; and  
 appear in person. 
 
These provisions have been criticised on the grounds that they undermine the right of 
procedural fairness and especially the audi alteram partem principle since they move away 
from the idea of a hearing being an indispensable right in the Constitution. The discretionary 
nature of these obligations can also be abused by administrators and there can even be 
inferences of bias if the administrator wantonly refuses legal representation, or the 
opportunity to dispute information or to appear in person. 
 
2.5.7 Departures from the minimum requirements 
                                                          
121 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director General : Department of  Environmental Affairs  and Tourism 2005 
(3) SA 156 (C) para 72.  




Although the requirements set out in section 3(2)(b) of PAJA are considered to be the 
minimum requirements for a fair hearing, section 3(4) of PAJA allows an administrator to 
depart from these minimum requirements in certain circumstances. Section 3(4)(a) provides 
in this respect that an administrator may depart from the minimum requirements when it is 
“reasonable and justifiable to do so”. 
 
When it comes to deciding whether it is reasonable and justifiable to depart from the 
minimum requirements, the administrator does not have an entirely free hand. Instead, 
section 3(4)(b) provides that the administrator must take certain factors into account. These 
are as follows:123 
(a)  the objects of the empowering provisions; 
(b)  the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action; 
(c)  the likely effect of the administrative action; 
(d)  the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and 
(e)  the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance. 
 
2.5.8 Section 4 of PAJA  
 
Section 4 set out the requirements for a fair hearing in those cases in which the administrative 
action does not materially and adversely affect the rights of an individual, but rather the rights 
of the public at large. Like section 3, it begins by setting out the circumstances in which the 
public are entitled to a fair hearing. Section 4(1) provides in this respect that “where an 
administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public”, the 
administrative action must be procedurally fair.  
 
After setting out the circumstances in which the public are entitled to procedural fairness, 
section 4 then goes on to set out the requirement for a fair procedure. In this respect section 
4(1) provides that in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, 
an administrator must hold a public inquiry or follow a notice and comment procedure or 
follow both procedures. Once the administrator has chosen one of these options, however, he 
                                                          
123 PAJA: Section 3(4)(b). 
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or she must follow the requirements of that procedure and may not choose a different 
procedure later on.124 
 
In those cases in which an administrator decides to hold a public inquiry, section 4(2) 
provides (a) that the administrator must conduct the public inquiry or appoint a suitably 
qualified person or panel of persons to do so; and (b) the administrator, or person or panel 
referred to in paragraph (a) must: 
(i)  determine the procedure for the public inquiry; 
(ii)  conduct the inquiry in accordance with that procedure; 
(iii)  compile a written report on the inquiry and give reasons for any administrative action 
taken or recommended; and 
(iv)  as soon as possible thereafter publish a summary of the report and take steps to 
publicise the report. 
 
These public inquiries are also regulated by the Regulations on Fair Administrative 
procedure.125 
 
In those cases in which an administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, 
section 4(3) provides that the administrator must: 
 
‘(a)  take appropriate steps to communicate the administrative action to those likely to be materially and 
adversely affected by it and call for comments from them; 
(b)  consider any comments received; 
(c)  decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or without changes; and 
(d)  comply with the procedures to be followed in correction with notice and comment procedures, as 
prescribed’. 
 
The Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedure also prescribed on the notice and comment 
procedures,126 
                                                          
124 PAJA: Section 4. 
125 Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures Published In Government Notice No. R. 1022 0f 31 July 2002 
(Government Gazette No. 23674). The regulations provide for publication of the inquiry in any two official 
languages, advertisement of the inquiry either nationally and regionally, stating who has been appointed to hold 
the inquiry. Also the notice or publication of the inquiry should have enough information about the impending 
decisions, to enable the public to investigate and make meaningful representations. This requirement reflects the 
opportunity be heard and make representations in section 3 for individuals. The publication also allows the 




Finally, section 4(4) provides that the administrator may depart from the requirements of 
sections 4(2) and 4(3) where it is reasonable and justifiable to do so. When it comes to 
deciding whether it is reasonable and justifiable to depart from the requirements of sections 
4(2) and 4(3), the administrator must take certain factors into account. These factors are 
exactly the same as those that an administrator must take into account when deciding whether 
to depart from the minimum requirements set out in section 3(2)(b). 
 
2.6 The nemo iudex in sua causa principle  
 
The nemo iudex in sua causa principle essentially provides that ‘no one should be judge in 
their own case’.127 It has traditionally been regarded as one of the elements of natural justice 
which ‘seeks to ensure that the decision maker is impartial or is seen to be impartial in the 
case s/he is to decide’.128 It is a rule that ensures that the decision maker is impartial and there 
is no bias when a decision is made thus it can be called the rule against bias.129 
 
The human mind as a result of socio-economic and even political environments is prone to be 
vulnerable to prejudices and De Ville has stated that there is no legal rule that can prevent 
these pre-held convictions from surfacing time and again.130 The assertion by De Ville that 
the human mind is susceptible to prejudice is the one that defines the importance of the rule 
against bias. The rule against bias simply ensures that those who come before the courts of 
law leave satisfied with the proceedings, fostering a sense of confidence in the legal system.  
 
Further, the rationale for the rule against bias is that there is need to instil in the public a 
sense of confidence in administrative justice and the appearance of bias destroys such 
confidence.131 Decision makers should be prevented from making decisions that are guided 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
126 Chapter 2 of the Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures provides, inter alia, that the public should 
adequately be notified, through an official language, timeously; provide for the illiterate that they make their 
contribution etc. 
 127De Lange v Smuts and others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 131. Also see M Wiechers ‘Administrative Law’ in 
The Law of South Africa Volume One (1976) 50. 
128 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Law in South Africa (2003) 268. 
129 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 451 
130 J R de Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 3-8. 
131 Metropolitan Properties Co (FCG) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 (CA) para 599F. 
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by their own interests, motives or considerations, they should not be influenced by any 
external force that has nothing to do with the decision that they are taking.132 
 
In the English jurisdiction there are 3 different tests competing for dominance to establishing 
bias which are: whether there is real bias; a reasonable apprehension of bias or a real 
likelihood of bias. 133 Actual bias is difficult to satisfy because it manifests in the mind of the 
decision-maker.134 Furthermore the reasonable apprehension of bias is preferred over the real 
likelihood of bias because it is captured in S 6(2)(a)(iii)  which provides that that  the court 
can review administrative action where the administrator ‘was biased or reasonably suspected 
of bias’. The accepted test therefore is the reasonable suspicion of bias.  
 
Considering that the reasonable suspicion of bias test is couched in the PAJA it has also been 
endorsed in the courts. In the case of BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and 
Allied Workers Union135 it was stated that: 
 
‘It is the right of the public to have their cases decided by persons who are free not only from fear but also from 
favour. In the end the only guarantee of impartiality on the part of the courts is conspicuous impartiality. To 
insist upon the appearance of a real likelihood of bias would, I think, cut at the very root of the principle, deeply 
embedded in our law, that justice must be seen to be done. It would impede rather than advance the due 
administration of justice. It is a hallowed maxim that if a judicial officer has any interest in the outcome of the 
matter before him (save an interest so clearly trivial in nature as to be disregarded under the de minimis 
principle) he is disqualified, no matter how small that interest may be. ... The law does not seek, in such a case 
to measure the amount of his interest. I venture to suggest that the matter stands no differently with regard to the 
apprehension of bias by a lay litigant. Provided the suspicion of partiality is one which might reasonably be 
entertained by a lay litigant a reviewing Court cannot, so I consider, be called upon to measure in a nice balance 
the precise extent of the apparent risk. If suspicion is reasonably apprehended, then that is an end to the 
matter.’136 
 
According to the case, one has to prove the appearance of bias rather than that bias actually 
existed. Some have called it reasonable apprehension of bias because of the controversy 
                                                          
132 C Hoexter The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume Two Administrative Law (2002) 191. 
133 City and Suburban Transport (Pty) Ltd v Local Board Transportation, Johannesburg 1932 WLD 100. 
134 BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Metal and Allied Workers’ Union and Others 1992 (3) 
SA 673 (A) 688D-697. 
135 BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union 1992 (3) SA 673 (A). 
136 BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union 1992 (3) SA 673 (A). 
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surrounding what exactly is “reasonable suspicion”.137 This distinction however is of little 
substantive significance.138 What is important is that a variety of scenarios have been held to 
indicate a reasonable apprehension of bias and these include that: where the administrator 
may gain (financially or otherwise) from the outcome of the case;139 or where a personal 
interest that a family member may benefit;140 or where the administrator already has a pre-
held expression of prejudice.141 It can be noted that considerations of bias may overlap with 
the other grounds, for example abuse of discretion like pursuing ulterior motives or taking 
irrelevant considerations into account.142 The test has the advantage that it removed from the 
court the burden of establishing the decision-maker’s state of mind.143 This means it is no 
longer a subjective test but an objective one. 
 
Caveat should be taken however to note that this test is for the minimum standard of bias. 
Suffice to say also that where actual bias is established the decision will consequently be set 




In summary we established in this chapter that procedural fairness adds a lot of value to the 
legal system especially in the area of public decision making. We have identified three main 
sources of procedural fairness as the common law, the Constitution and the PAJA. Since the 
thesis deals with questions of decision making by public officials, the PAJA was the main 
source that we discussed because it deals with procedural fairness under administrative law 
which also is a branch of public law.  
 
Supplementing the PAJA with the common law principles and the Constitution we elaborated 
the content of procedural fairness. At the very basic, procedural fairness involves the 
principle of natural justice at common law which have been developed the Constitution into a 
right to procedural fairness. The PAJA outlines the components and requirements of the right 
                                                          
137 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 (2) SA 14 
(CC) para 38. 
138 Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA) para 15. 
139 See for example Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W). 
140 See for example Lienburg v Brakpan Liqour Licensing 1944 WLD 52. 
141 See for example Patel v Witbank Town Council 1931 TPD 284. 
142 C Hoexter The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume Two Administrative Law (2002) 191. 
143 E Murienik ‘Administrative law’ 1992 Annual Survey of South African Law 730 731. 
144 L A Rose Innes Judicial review of Administrative Tribunals in South Africa (1963) 173ff. 
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to procedurally fair administrative actions. In doing so the PAJA appreciates that procedural 
fairness is a flexible concept which is applied with vast regard to the circumstances of each 
case. 
 
From here we move to the next chapter where we shall discuss this concept of procedural 
fairness under the rule of law (legality). In the coming chapter we shall discuss a variety of 
cases in which the Constitutional Court has dealt with whether procedural fairness is a part of 

































Having set out and discussed the scope and ambit of the right procedural fairness primarily 
from an administrative law perspective, we may now turn to consider the different 
approaches the Constitutional Court has adopted towards procedural fairness as a separate 
and self-standing ground of review for executive action under the rule of law.  
 
As we saw in Chapter One, the Constitutional Court initially adopted a strict approach in its 
majority judgment in Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa145 and unanimous 
judgment in Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa v President of the Republic 
of South Africa.146 In these cases the Court held that executive action cannot be reviewed on 
the grounds that it is procedurally unfair. Or, to put it another way, in these cases the Court 
held that the principle of legality should not be interpreted to include the right to procedural 
fairness as a separate and self-standing ground of review for executive action. For the sake of 
convenience, this approach may be referred to as the ‘no to procedural fairness’ approach. 
 
Following its majority judgment in Masetlha and unanimous judgment in ARMSA, however, 
the Constitutional Court began to move towards a broader approach. This move started in 
Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation,147 where the Court held that 
executive action may be reviewed and set aside in those cases where the failure to follow a 
fair procedure was irrational and confirmed in Democratic Alliance v President of the 
Republic of South Africa,148 where the Court held that executive action may be reviewed and 
set aside in those cases where not only the decision, but also the process that preceded the 
decision was irrational. This approach may be referred to as the ‘yes to procedural rationality’ 
approach. 
 
                                                          
145 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
146 Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (7) 
BCLR 762 (CC). 
147 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). 
148 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
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Most recently the move towards a broader approach almost came to fruition in Minister of 
Defence and Military Veterans v Motau.149 Like its minority judgment in Masetlha, the 
Constitutional Court unanimously suggested, in an obiter dictum, that executive action could 
in fact be reviewed on the grounds that it is procedurally unfair. Or, to put it another way, the 
Court suggested, in an obiter dictum, that the principle of legality should be interpreted to 
include the right to procedural fairness as a separate and self-standing ground of review for 
executive action. This approach may be referred to as the ‘maybe yes to procedural fairness’ 
approach. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out and analyses these different approaches 
 
3.2 The ‘no to procedural fairness’ approach 
 
3.2.1 Introduction  
 
As pointed out above, the Constitutional Court initially adopted a strict approach in its 
judgments in Masetlha and ARMSA. Both of these cases will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.2.2 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa: The majority judgment 
 
(a) The facts 
 
The facts of this case are as follows. In 2004 Mr Billy Masetlha was appointed as the Director 
of the National Intelligence Agency (the ‘NIA’) by the President for a period of three years. 
In 2005 a prominent businessman by the name of Mr Saki Macozoma complained to the 
Minister of Intelligence that he had been placed under surveillance by members of the NIA. 
After receiving this complaint, the Minister asked Mr Masetlha for an explanation. The 
Minister, however, was dissatisfied with the explanation he received from Mr Masetlha and 
asked the Inspector-General of Intelligence to investigate the matter. Following his 
investigation, the Inspector-General came to the conclusion that the decision to place Mr 
Macozoma under surveillance was unlawful. In addition, he also found that Mr Masetlha had 
                                                          
149 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
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deliberately sought to mislead the investigating team and the Minister and recommended that 
a disciplinary hearing should be held. 
 
After the Minister received the Inspector-General’s report, Mr Masetlha was summoned to 
several meetings with the President and the Minister. At the last of these meeting, the 
Minister read out a letter advising Mr Masetlha that he had been suspended from his position 
as the Director-General. Approximately three weeks later, the President issued a Presidential 
Minute confirming the Minister’s decision to suspend Mr Masetlha. In response, Mr Masetlha 
applied to the High Court for an order setting aside the President’s decision to suspend him. 
Following this application, the President claimed that the relationship of trust between him 
and Mr Masetlha had irretrievably broken down and he then dismissed Mr Masetlha by 
amending his term of office so that it expired two days later.  
 
After the President dismissed Mr Masetlha’s by amending his term of office, Mr Mastlha 
applied to the High Court for an order declaring that the President had no power to 
unilaterally dismiss him and that he was still the Director-General. The High Court rejected 
this application and Mr Masetlha then appealed to the Constitutional Court. In the 
Constitutional Court he based his application on a number of different grounds. One of these 
was that the President’s decision to dismiss him was an administrative decision and, 
consequently, that the President was required, in terms of section 3(2) of PAJA, to follow a 
fair procedure before he made his decision. Unfortunately, the President did not do this and 
his decision, therefore, was invalid. 
 
(b) The judgment 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court rejected Mr Masetlha’s argument. In arriving at this 
decision, the Court first had to determine whether the President’s decision to dismiss Mr 
Masetlha was an administrative or an executive decision. Insofar as this issue was concerned, 
the Court found that the President’s decision should be classified as an executive and not as 
an administrative one. The Court held further that this was because the power given to the 
President to appoint and dismiss the Director-General of the NIA was a special one aimed at 
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promoting the effective business of government and, especially, the effective pursuit of 
national security.150  
 
Given that the President’s decision to dismiss Mr Masetlha was an executive decision and not 
an administrative decision, the Constitutional Court also held, it would not be appropriate to 
subject it to the requirements of procedural fairness, which is a ground on which 
administrative action may be reviewed, but not a ground on which executive action could be 
reviewed. When it comes to deciding whether the exercise of public power should be 
subjected to the requirements of procedural fairness, the Court held further, the courts should 
be careful not to impose obligations on the government that will inhibit its ability to act in an 
effective manner.151 
 
Even though executive actions do not need to be exercised in a procedurally fair manner, the 
Constitutional Court went on to hold that this does not mean that there are no constraints on 
executive action. Executive action still has to be exercised in a lawful and rational manner: 
 
‘This does not, however, mean that there are no constitutional constraints on the exercise of executive authority. 
The authority conferred must be exercised lawfully, rationally and in a manner consistent with the Constitution. 
Procedural fairness is not a requirement. The authority in section 85(2)(e) of the Constitution is conferred in 
order to provide room for the President to fulfil executive functions and should not be constrained any more 
than through the principle of legality and rationality’.152 
 
After setting out these principles, the Constitutional Court turned to apply them to the facts. 
In this respect the Court failed to see any suggestion that indicated that the President acted 
arbitrarily or without sufficient reason. It stated that the breakdown in relationship between 
the President as head of the executive and Mr Masethla as head of the Agency, constituted a 
rational basis for the decision to dismiss Mr Masethla.153  
 
3.2.3 ARMSA v President of the Republic of South Africa 
 
(a) The facts 
 
                                                          
150 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africar 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 75 and 77. 
151 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 77 
152 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 78 
153 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 24-25 
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The facts of this case are as follows. In April 2010, the Independent Commission for the 
Remuneration of Public Office Bearers (the ‘Commission’) – acting in accordance with the 
provisions of the Independent Remuneration of Public Office-bearers Act154 – proposed that 
public office-bearers, including Regional Magistrates and Regional Court Presidents, should 
receive an increase of 7% in their annual salaries for the 2010/2011 financial year. Before 
submitting this proposed recommendation to the President, however, the Commission sent a 
letter to the Chief Justice setting out is proposal and asking for his comments. 
 
After receiving this letter, the Chief Justice asked the Commission to send its proposal to the 
Magistrates’ Commission, which it did. The Magistrates’ Commission then forwarded the 
letter to the Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa (‘ARMSA’), which 
represented approximately 90% of Regional Magistrates. In response to the Commission’s 
proposal, ARMSA raised a number of concerns. Among these were a lack of consultation, the 
gap between the proposed increase and the annual cost of living and the gap between the 
remuneration of judges and magistrates and between judicial officers and other public 
officials. 
 
Despite receiving these concerns, the Commission ultimately decided to adopt its proposed 
recommendation and in September 2010 it submitted a report to the President in which it 
recommended that the annual salaries of public office bearers, including Regional 
Magistrates and Regional Court Presidents, should be increased by 7% for the 2010/2011 
financial year. In its report, the Commission indicated that it had consulted with the Minister 
of Finance, the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice.  
 
After he received the report, the President consulted with the Minister of Finance. During 
these consultations, the Minister indicated that he was opposed to the Commission’s 
recommendation because inflations was predicted to fall to 5.2% and the Commission’s 
recommendation would impose an undue burden on the national fiscus. The President agreed 
with the arguments made by the Minister and rejected the Commission’s recommendation. 
He then decided to increase the annual salaries of public office-bearers by only 5%. Shortly 
thereafter the President’s decision was forwarded to Parliament for approval and Parliament 
did so in November 2010. The decision was then published in the Government Gazette. 
                                                          




After the President’s decision was published in the Government Gazette, ARMSA applied to 
the High Court for an order setting it aside. The High Court rejected this application and 
ARMSA then appealed to the Constitutional Court. In the Constitutional Court, ARMSA 
based its application on a number of grounds. One of these was that the President’s decision 
was an administrative decision and, consequently, that the President was required, in terms of 
section 3(2) of PAJA, to follow a fair procedure and give ARMSA an reasonable opportunity 
to make representations before he made his decision. Unfortunately, the President did not do 
this and his decision, therefore, was invalid. 
 
(b) The judgment 
 
A unanimous Constitutional Court rejected this argument. In arriving at this decision, the 
Court first had to determine whether the President’s decision to increase the annual salaries of 
public office-bearers by only 5% was an administrative or executive decision. Insofar as this 
issue was concerned, the Court found that the President’s decision should be classified as an 
executive and not as an administrative one for a number of reasons.  
 
One of these reasons was that the adequate remuneration of judicial officers is an important 
element of the independence of the judiciary. If judicial officers do not enjoy financial 
security, their ability to act independently may be put under strain. Given the sensitive nature 
of this issue, the Court held further, it could not be said that the President was merely 
‘carrying out the daily functions of the State’ when he made his decision.155 
 
Another reason why the President’s decision was not an administrative decision, but rather an 
executive decision, the Constitutional Court went on to hold, is because it was subject to a 
number of checks and balances. Apart from receiving a recommendation from the 
Commission, the President also had to consult with the Minister of Finance and submit his 
decision to Parliament for approval. The decision also had to be published in the Government 
Gazette.156  
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The fact that the President’s decision was not an administrative decision, but rather an 
executive act, the Court concluded, meant that it was not governed by the principles of 
administrative justice as set out in PAJA, but rather by the principle of the rule of law and, in 
particular, the principle of legality. The Court summed up this finding as follows: 
 
‘In essence, when the President made the determination he was exercising a power which impacts on a matter 
that is of importance to the independence of the judiciary, in terms of a particular constitutional and legislative 
scheme, subject to clear statutory checks, balances and standards of review. In light of this Court’s decision in 
Masetlha, that renders his conduct ‘executive’ rather than ‘administrative’ in nature. Given the significance of 
the President’s decision, the careful manner in which Parliament has prescribed that it should be taken and the 
complexity of the ultimate determination, I conclude that the President’s decision did not constitute 
administrative action and that PAJA does not apply. The applicant’s argument on this issue must thus fail. . . 
.’157 
 
In its judgment in Masetlha, the Constitutional Court then held, it found that executive action 
may be reviewed only on certain narrow grounds that fall within the principle of legality. 
These grounds include lawfulness and rationality. Unlike administrative action, however, 
they do not include procedural fairness. This is because procedural fairness is not a 
requirement for the exercise of executive action. This means, the Court held further, that 
executive action cannot be challenged unless a hearing is specifically required by the 
enabling statute and in this case the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 – which regulates the 
payment of salaries to magistrates – did not impose such a duty on the President.158 
 
In light of these principles, the Constitutional Court went on to conclude, ARMSA’s 
argument had to be rejected. In its own words the Court stated that: 
 
‘A further issue relates to ARMSA’s contention that neither it nor its members were consulted either by the 
Commission or the President. The applicant argues that the decision was procedurally unfair. The challenge is 
without merit. With regard to the decision of the President, a procedural fairness challenge is not competent 
because the decision he took did not amount to administrative action. As it was pronounced in Masetlha, 
executive action may be reviewed on narrow grounds which fall within the ambit of the principle of legality. 
These grounds include lawfulness and rationality. Procedural fairness is not a requirement for the exercise of 
executive powers and therefore executive action cannot be challenged on the ground that the affected party was 
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not given a hearing unless a hearing is specifically required by the enabling statute. Section 12 of the 




The judgments in both Masetlha and ARMSA have been criticised by academic commentators 
on a number of different grounds. Among the most important of these criticisms are the 
following: 
 
First, as Plasket points out, apart from the minimalist version of the rule of law (which would 
have legitimised the laws of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa), both the formalist 
version and the substantive version accept that the rule of law encompasses the right to 
procedural fairness.160 In addition, he points out further, the Constitutional Court itself 
appears to have accepted that the rule of law does encompass the right to procedural fairness 
in its judgment in De Lange v Smuts NO161 when it held that laws should be ‘pre-announced, 
general, durable and reasonably precise rules administered by regular courts or similar 
independent tribunals according to fair procedures’.162 
 
Second, as Raz has pointed out, both the formalist and substantive versions of the rule of law 
accept that it encompasses the right to procedural fairness because procedural fairness 
promotes a number of very important values in a democratic society.163 One of these is that 
procedural fairness improves the quality and wisdom of decision making.164 Another of these 
is that it also demonstrates respect for the dignity of the participants.165 In addition, 
procedural fairness also promotes some of the values that underlie the Constitution such as 
accountability, responsiveness, openness and public participation.166 
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Third, given how well established the audi alteram partem principle is in South African law 
and particularly how well established it is in the context of dismissals,167 Hoexter points out 
that the judgment in Masetlha appears to be regressive.168 This is because, first, it is difficult 
to understand how national security would be threatened by requiring the President to give 
Mr Masetlha a hearing and, second, because the Court defined the rule of law more narrowly 
than it is was defined under the common law during the apartheid era.169 Ngcobo J makes a 
similar point in his dissenting judgment in Masetlha when he said the following: 
 
‘The new constitutional order incorporates common law constitutional principles and gives them greater 
substance.  The rule of law is specifically declared to be one of the foundational values of the new constitutional 
order.  The content of the rule of law principle under our new constitutional order cannot be less than what it 
was under the common law’.170 
 
Finally, Kruger argued that the approach in Masetlha sets ‘a perilous precedent reducing the 
constraints on executive power, significantly and potentially eroding the supremacy of the 
constitution in that respect’.171 In order to avoid such a precedent, she argues further, that ‘the 
only sensible way to read the decision in Mesetlha is to regard the finding on procedural 
fairness and the rule of law, not as a general rule, but driven by the specific context of the 
case: that of the need to protect national security, which cannot be achieved if the President‘s 
relationship of trust with the head of the NIA has broken down irreparably’172.  
 




Following its judgments in Masetlha and ARMSA, however, the Constitutional Court began to 
move towards a broader approach. This move started in Albutt v Centre for the Study of 
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Violence and Reconciliation173 and was confirmed in Democratic Alliance v President of the 
RSA.174 Both of these cases will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.3.2 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
 
(a) The facts 
 
The facts of this case are as follows. In November 2007 the President announced in 
Parliament that in order to complete the unfinished work of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (the ‘TRC’) he intended to create a special dispensation in terms of which 
certain prisoners could apply for a presidential pardon in terms of section 84(2)(j) of the 
Constitution. The prisoners who could apply in terms of this special dispensation, he 
announced further, were those who had been convicted of a politically motivated offence 
committed before 16 June 1999 and who had chosen not to participate in the TRC 
proceedings for whatever reason 
 
When he made this announcement, the President explained that those prisoners who qualified 
for a presidential pardon would have to submit an application to a specially created multi-
party Pardon Reference Group (the ‘PRG’). The PRG, he explained further, would consider 
each application and make a recommendation to him. He would then personally consider 
each recommendation and make a decision based on the information placed before him. 
 
When it came to deciding whether to grant a pardon or not, the President went on to explain, 
he would be guided by the ‘principles and values which underpin the Constitution, including 
the principles and objectives of national unity and national reconciliation; and, uphold and be 
guided by the principles, criteria and spirit that inspired and underpinned the process of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, especially as they related to the amnesty process’.175 
 
Following the President’s announcement, the respondents (who were a coalition of non-
governmental organisations) made numerous requests for the victims of the offences in 
respect of which pardons were sought to participate in the special dispensation process. 
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Unfortunately, these requests were rejected, first, by the PRG and then by the President. After 
the President rejected their requests, the respondents applied to the High Court for an order 
preventing the President from granting any such pardons without first giving the victims a 
hearing. 
 
The respondents based their application on the grounds that the decision to grant a pardon in 
terms of section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution was an administrative decision and, 
consequently, that the President was obliged, in terms of section 3(2) of PAJA, to follow a 
fair procedure before he made such a decision. The High Court agreed with this argument and 
granted the order. The applicants then appealed to the Constitutional Court.  
 
(b) The judgment 
 
A unanimous Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court held first that it was unnecessary to determine whether the President’s decision should 
be classified as an administrative or executive decision. This is because it is a well-
established principle of South African constitutional law that the exercise of all public power 
has to comply with the principle of legality. The principle of legality, the Court held further, 
provides that every exercise of public power, including the President’s decision to grant a 
pardon, has to be both lawful and rational.176 
 
In order to determine whether the President’s decision to grant a pardon was rational, the 
Constitutional Court then held, it had to determine whether the means adopted by the 
President were rationally related to the ends. Or, to put it another way, it had to determine 
whether the decision to exclude the victims from participating in the special dispensation 
process was rationally related to the objectives the President announced in Parliament, 
namely national unity and national reconciliation.177 
 
Apart from setting out these objectives, the Constitutional Court went on to hold, the 
President also announced in Parliament that they would be achieved by applying the 
principles, criteria and spirit that inspired and underpinned the process of the TRC, especially 
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as they related to the amnesty process. It was therefore, important to identify what the 
principles, criteria and spirit underlying the amnesty process actually were.178 
 
In order to identify them, the Constitutional Court then held, there could be no doubt that the 
participation of the victims was crucial. This is because it did not only help victims to 
discover the truth of what happened to their loved ones, but also because it contributed to the 
twin objectives of nation building and national reconciliation by assuaging the victims’ 
yearning for the truth and addressing their legitimate sense of resentment and grief.179 
 
Given that the objectives of the amnesty process could only be achieved through the 
participation of the victims, the Constitutional Court held further that, it followed that the 
objectives of the special dispensation could also only be achieved through the participation of 
the victims. This meant, the Court concluded, that the participation of the victims was 
fundamental to the special dispensation and their exclusion was not rationally related to its 
objectives. The participation of the victims therefore was the only rational means of 
achieving national unity and reconciliation. 
 
‘In these circumstances, the requirement to afford the victims a hearing is implicit, if not explicit, in the very 
specific features of the special dispensation process. Indeed, the context-specific features of the special 
dispensation and in particular its objectives of national unity and national reconciliation, requires, as a matter of 
rationality, that the victims must be given the opportunity to be heard in order to determine the facts on which 
pardons are based’.180 
 
3.3.3 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 
 
(a) The facts 
 
The facts of this case are as follows. In 2009 President Zuma appointed Mr Menzi Simelane 
as the National Director of Public Prosecutions (the “NDPP”). Prior to his appointment as the 
NDPP, Mr Simelane was the Director-General of the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development. While he was the Director-General, Mr Simelane was called as 
a witness to give evidence under oath at the Ginwala Commission of Inquiry. The Ginwala 
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Commission had been established by former President Mbeki in order to investigate the 
previous NDPP’s fitness to hold office. The previous NDPP was Mr Vusi Pikoli. 
 
In its final report, the Ginwala Commission severely criticised Mr Simelane and questioned 
the truthfulness of his evidence. Following these criticisms, the then Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Mr Enver Surty, asked the Public Service Commission to 
investigate Mr Simelane’s conduct. Following its investigation, the Public Service 
Commission recommended that disciplinary steps should be taken against Mr Simelane. The 
new Minister, Mr Jeff Radebe, however, rejected the recommendation of the Public Service 
Commission and two days later President Zuma appointed Mr Simelane as the NDPP. 
 
The Democratic Alliance (the “DA”) then applied to the High Court for an order declaring 
the President Zuma’s decision to appoint Mr Simelane to be unconstitutional and invalid. The 
DA based its application on the grounds that the President’s decision to appoint Mr Simelane 
as the NDPP was irrational and, therefore, infringed the principle of the rule of law. President 
Zuma’s decision to appoint Mr Simelane was irrational, the DA argued further, because the 
report of the Ginwala Commission showed that he was not a “fit and proper person” to be the 
NDPP as required by the National Prosecuting Authority Act.181 
 
The High Court disagreed with this argument and refused to grant the order. The DA then 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the DA 
and upheld the appeal. The President then appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
 
 (b) The judgment 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal. Like in the Albutt case, the 
Court held first that it was unnecessary to determine whether the President’s decision should 
be classified as an administrative or executive decision. This is because it was a well-
established principle of South African constitutional law that the exercise of all public power 
had to comply with the principle of legality. The principle of legality, the Court held further, 
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provides that every exercise of public power, including the President’s decision to appoint Mr 
Simelane has to be both lawful and rational.182  
 
In order to determine whether the President’s decision to appoint Mr Simelane was rational, 
the Constitutional Court then held, it had to consider a number of different issues. One of 
these was whether the test for rationality applies not only to the President’s decision, but also 
to the process by which the President made his decision. This question, the Court held 
further, had in fact already been answered in Albutt when it found that the means were not 
rationality related to the purpose because the procedure by which the decision was taken did 
not provide an opportunity for victims or their family members to be heard. It followed, 
therefore, that both the process by which a decision was made and the decision itself had to 
be rational.183   
 
Although Mr Simelane argued that the case at hand did not deal with the President’s power to 
pardon offenders but rather with the President’s power to make an appointment, the 
Constitutional Court held, there was no reason why the approach adopted in Albutt should 
apply only to pardons and not to appointments.184 In fact, the Court held further, it would be 
illogical if the test for rationality applied to both the decision and the process by which the 
decision was made in the case of pardons, but only to the decision (and not to the process by 
which the decision was made) in the case of appointments.185 
 
Given these points, the Constitutional Court concluded, there is no doubt that both the 
decision that was taken and the process by which that decision was taken must be rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given. 
 
‘The conclusion that the process must also be rational in that it must be rationally related to the achievement of 
the purpose for which the power is conferred, is inescapable and an inevitable consequence of the understanding 
that rationality review is an evaluation of the relationship between means and ends. The means for achieving the 
purpose for which the power was conferred must include everything that is done to achieve the purpose. Not 
only the decision employed to achieve the purpose, but also everything done in the process of taking that 
decision, constitute means towards the attainment of the purpose for which the power was conferred’.186 
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After setting out and discussing other principles, the Constitutional Court turned to apply 
them to the facts. In this respect the Court found that the process which lead up to the 
President’s decision to appoint Mr Simelane as the NDPP was not rationally related to the 
object, namely to appoint a ‘fit and proper person’. The reason why the process was not 
rationally related to the object, the Court found further, is because the President had 
deliberately decided not to take into account certain relevant information, namely the 
Ginwala Commission Report.187 
 
3.3.4 Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town 
 
Apart from the two Constitutional Court judgments discussed above, it should be noted that 
the approach adopted in Albutt, was also followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town.188  
 
(a) The facts 
 
Very briefly, the facts of this case are as follows. In May 2012 the Director-General of the 
Department of Home Affairs decided for a variety of reasons that the Refugee Reception 
Office in Cape Town would no longer receive and process applications for asylum in terms of 
the Refugees Act.189 An important consequence of the Director-General’s decision was that 
applications for asylum could no longer be made in Cape Town. Instead, they had to be made 
at other Refugee Reception Offices, all of which were situated in other provinces and 
especially along the northern borders of the country. 
 
After the Director-General had made his decision, the Scalabrini Centre – a non-profit 
organisation that assisted displaced persons – applied to the High Court for an order setting it 
aside. The High Court granted the order and the Minister then appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the respondent based its application on a number 
of different grounds. One of these was that the Director-General’s decision was an 
administrative decision and, consequently, that he was required, in terms of section 3(2) of 
                                                          
187  Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) para 92 
188 Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA).  
189 130 of 1998. 
50 
 
PAJA to follow a fair procedure and give the respondent a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations. Unfortunately, the Director-General did not do this and his decision, 
therefore, was invalid. 
 
(b) The judgment 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In arriving at this decision, the Court 
first had to determine whether the Minister’s decision to close the Refugee Reception Office 
was an administrative or executive decision. Insofar as this issue was concerned, the Court 
found that the Minister’s decision should be classified as an executive decision because it was 
heavily influenced by policy considerations. 
 
‘I think it is clear from those and other cases that decisions heavily influenced by policy generally belong in the 
domain of the executive. It seems to me that if decisions of that kind are to be deferred to by the courts then that 
must necessarily be a strong guide to what falls outside “administrative action” and the review powers given to 
the courts by PAJA. The more a decision is to be driven by considerations of executive policy the further it 
moves from being reviewable under PAJA and vice versa. That seems to me to be consistent with SARFU, in 
which it was said that one of the considerations to be taken into account in determining what constitutes 
administrative action is “how closely it is related … to policy matters, which are not administrative”’.190 
 
‘While that is not necessarily the only factor that is relevant to whether conduct is administrative action, I think 
it is sufficient for our decision in this case. The question whether a Refugee Reception Office is necessary for 
achieving the purpose of the Act is quintessentially one of policy. Where, and how many, offices should be 
established, will necessarily be determined by matters like administrative effectiveness and efficiency, 
budgetary constraints, availability of human and other resources, policies of the department, the broader political 
framework within which it must function, and the like. I do not think courts, not in possession of all that 
information, and not accountable to the electorate, are properly equipped or permitted to make those 
decisions’.191 
 
The fact that the Minister’s decision was not an administrative decision, but rather an 
executive decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, meant that it was not governed by the 
principles of administrative justice set out in PAJA, but rather by the principle of the rule of 
law and, in particular, the principle of legality. Insofar as the principle of legality was 
concerned, the Court pointed out, the Scalabrini Centre suggested that it imposed a general 
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obligation on those who exercise public power to follow a fair procedure and give interested 
parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations.192 
 
While this suggestion went too far, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, in light of the 
Constitutional Court’s judgments in Albutt and Democratic Alliance there is no doubt that 
there are circumstances in which the failure to follow a fair procedure would be irrational 
and, therefore, unconstitutional. Procedural fairness, therefore, is a ground on which an 
executive decision may be reviewed, but only to the extent that the requirement of rationality 
demands it.193  
 
After setting out these principles, the Supreme Court of Appeal turned to apply them to the 
facts. In this respect, it found that the Director-General should have followed a fair procedure 
before he made his decision to essentially close down the Refugee Reception Office in Cape 
Town. This was largely because he had promised interested and affected parties, like the 
Scalabrini Centre, that he would do so. Given this promise, the Director-General’s failure to 
follow a fair procedure was irrational and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
 
‘That conclusion in this case does not have as a consequence that there is a general duty on decision makers to 
consult organisations or individuals having an interest in their decisions. Such a duty will arise only in 
circumstances where it would be irrational to take the decision without such consultation, because of the special 
knowledge of the person or organisation to be consulted, of which the decision maker is aware. Here the 
irrationality arises because the Director-General, through his representatives, at the meeting on 7 May 2012, 
acknowledged the necessity for such consultation. That he did so is not surprising bearing in mind that the 
organisations represented at that meeting included not only the Scalabrini Centre, with its close links to the 
refugee community, but also the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and organisations close to 




Given the criticisms levelled against the judgments in Masetlha and ARMSA, it is not 
surprising that the judgments in Albutt and Democratic Alliance have been welcomed by 
most academic commentators. As Price points out, however, the judgments in Albutt and 
Democratic Alliance appear to be in tension with one another. One way in which this tension 
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may be resolved, he suggests, is to argue that Masetlha has been implicitly overruled. 
Another more satisfactory manner, he suggests further, is to draw a distinction between 
‘procedural fairness’, on the one hand, and ‘procedural rationality’, on the other.195 
 
While procedural fairness is not a separate and self-standing requirement of the principle of 
legality, procedural fairness is sometimes required as a part of the requirement of rationality, 
particularly in those cases where the decision maker has essentially promised to follow a fair 
procedure.196 This approach is more satisfactory, Price argues, because it gives the President 
and other members of the executive a degree of flexibility. They do not always have to follow 
a fair procedure, but must do so if it would be irrational not to. He does go on to point out, 
however, that it will be very difficult in practice to distinguish between those cases in which a 
fair procedure must be followed in order to satisfy the requirement of rationality and those in 
which it does not have to be followed.197 
 




The move away from a strict approach towards a liberal approach almost came to fruition in 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau198 where the Constitutional Court 
suggested in an obiter dicta that executive action could in fact be reviewed on the grounds 
that it is procedurally unfair. This approach is also in keeping with the minority judgment in 
Masetlha. 
 
3.4.2 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 
 
(a) The facts 
 
The facts of this case are as follows. In August 2013, the Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans dismissed the Chairperson (General Maomela Motau) and Deputy Chairperson (Ms 
Refiloe Makoena) from the Board of Directors of the Armaments Corporation of South 
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Africa Ltd (“Armscor”). Armscor is a wholly state-owned company. It is regulated by the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa Act (the “Armscor Act”).199 It was established to 
serve as the Department of Defence’s armaments and technology procurement agency.  
 
The Minister dismissed General Motau and Ms Makoena in terms of section 8(c) of the 
Armscor Act. This section provides that “[a] member of the Board must vacate office if his or 
her services are terminated by the Minister on good cause shown”. The Minister dismissed 
General Motau and Ms Makoena in terms of section 8(c) on a number of different grounds. 
Included among these were:  
(a)  delays in the timeous progression of a number of procurement projects as a result of 
the Board’s decisions or inaction; 
(b)  the failure to conclude a service level agreement between Armscor and the 
Department of Defence; and 
(c)  complaints the Minister had received about Armscor from the defence industry 
indicating that the relationship between Armscor and the industry was poor.  
 
After the Minister terminated General Motau and Ms Makoena’s membership of the Armscor 
Board, they both applied to the High Court for an order setting the Minister’s decision aside. 
The High Court granted the order and the Minister then appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
In the Constitutional Court General Motau and Ms Makoena based their application on the 
grounds that the Minister’s decision was an administrative decision and, consequently, that 
she was required to follow a fair procedure in terms of section 3(2) of PAJA and give them a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations before she made her decision. Unfortunately, 
she did not do so and her decision, therefore, was invalid. 
 
(b) The judgment 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal. In arriving at this decision, the 
Court first had to determine whether the Minister’s decision to terminate General Motau and 
Ms Makoena’s membership of the Armscor Board was an administrative or executive 
decision. Insofar as this issue was concerned, the Court found that the Minister’s decision 
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should be classified as an executive and not as an administrative one for the following 
reasons:  
 
(a)  First, the Minister’s power to terminate a person’s membership of the Armscor Board 
in terms of section 8(c) of the Armscor Act was a part of her power to formulate 
defence policy. As such it had a political dimension and, accordingly, was more 
executive than administrative in nature.200  
 
(b)  Second, the powers conferred on the Minister by section 8(c) of the Armscor Act 
were not low-level bureaucratic powers that formed part of the daily functions of the 
state. Instead, they were high-level powers that formed part of her power to supervise 
high-ranking public-office bearers in the performance of their duties.201 
 
(c)  Third, when it came to terminating a person’s membership of the Armscor Board, 
section 8(c) of the Armscor Act conferred a wide discretion on the Minister. She 
simply had to show that she had good cause in order to justify the termination. She 
did not have to satisfy any other jurisdictional requirements. This broad discretion 
also indicated that her power was more executive than administrative in nature. The 
mere fact that her power was derived from legislation was not determinative.202 
 
The fact that the Minister’s decision was not an administrative decision, but rather an 
executive act, the Constitutional Court concluded, meant that it was not governed by the 
principles of administrative justice as set out in PAJA, but rather by the principle of the rule 
of law and, in particular, the principle of legality. The Court summed up this finding as 
follows: 
 
‘For these reasons, I am persuaded that the impugned decisions are not subject to review under PAJA. Because 
section 8(c) of the Armscor Act is an adjunct of the Minister’s power to make defence policy, and thus more 
closely related to the formulation of policy than its application, the decision to terminate the services of Board 
members amounts to the performance of an executive function in terms of section 85(2)(c) of the Constitution, 
rather than the implementation of national legislation in terms of section 85(2)(a)’.203 
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After finding that the Minister’s decision to terminate General Motau and Ms Makoena’s  
membership of the Armscor Board was governed by the principle of legality rather than 
PAJA, the Constitutional Court turned to consider, first, whether the Minister’s decision was 
rational; and, second, whether the Minister was required to comply with the requirements of 
procedural fairness, as General Motau and Ms Makoena argued. 
 
Insofar as the question of rationality was concerned, the Constitutional Court began by setting 
out the test for rationality, namely that the exercise of power must be rationally related to the 
purpose for which that power has been given. After setting out this test, the Court applied it 
to the facts. In this respect it found that there was a rational link between the termination of 
General Motau and Ms Makoena’s membership of the Armscor Board (the “means”) and the 
need to address the failures at Armscor (the “ends”). The Minister’s decision, therefore, did 
satisfy the test for rationality.204  
 
Insofar as the question of procedural fairness was concerned, the Constitutional Court began 
by observing that Armscor fell within the definition of a “state owned company” in terms of 
the Companies Act.205 This meant that for all intents and purposes, Armscor had to be treated 
in the same way as any other public company unless the Minister had applied to exempt 
Armscor from the provisions of the Companies Act, which she had not.206 In addition, it also 
meant that the Minister was considered to be the shareholder of Armscor. She had the power 
to appoint and dismiss the members of the Board.207 
 
An important consequence of the fact that Armscor was governed not only by the Armscor 
Act, but also by the Companies Act, the Constitutional Court observed further, is that while 
the Armscor Act set out the substantive grounds which have to be satisfied before a person’s 
membership of the Board can be terminated, the Companies Act set out the procedural 
requirements that have to be satisfied before a person’s membership of the Board can be 
terminated.208  
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The procedural requirements that had to be satisfied, the Constitutional Court went on to 
observe, are set out in sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act. Section 71(1) states in 
this respect that: 
 
‘Despite anything to the contrary in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any agreement 
between a company and a director, or between any shareholders and a director, a director may be removed by an 
ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an 
election of that director, subject to subsection (2)’. 
 
And section 71(2) states that: 
 
‘Before the shareholders of a company may consider a resolution contemplated in subsection (1): 
(a)  the director concerned must be given notice of the meeting and the resolution, at least equivalent to that 
which a shareholder is entitled to receive, irrespective of whether or not the director is a shareholder of 
the company; and  
(b)  the director must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a 
representative, to the meeting, before the resolution is put to a vote.’ 
 
Given that the Minister was shareholder for the purposes of section 71(1) and (2), the 
Constitutional Court held, it followed that she was required to comply with the procedural 
requirements in the section.209 Unfortunately, the Court then concluded, when she exercised 
her powers in terms of section 8(c) of the Armscor Act and terminated the membership of 
General Motau and Ms Makoena the Minister did not comply with the procedural 
requirements set out in sections 71(1) and (3) of the Companies Act. Her decision, therefore, 
was unlawful and invalid.210 
 
Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court had already found that the Minister’s decision 
was unlawful and invalid because she failed to follow the procedures set out in the 
Companies Act, the Court turned to consider whether the principle of legality also imposed 
an obligation on her to follow a fair procedure before she terminated General Motau and Ms 
Makoena’s membership of the Board. 
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In this respect, the Constitutional Court began by pointing out that its earlier decision in 
Masetlha had been interpreted to “exclude the requirement of procedural fairness in the 
review of executive action as a stand-alone requirement under the principle of legality”. This 
was wrong, the Court pointed out further. The judgment in Masetlha does not stand for such 
an unequivocal proposition. Instead, the judgment in Masetlha was limited to the specific 
circumstances of that case. 
 
‘Were it not for the operation of the Companies Act, would there be an obligation on the Minister to dismiss 
directors in a procedurally fair manner? This Court’s decision in Masetlha, which was extensively relied on by 
the Minister in her submissions, has been interpreted to exclude the requirement of procedural fairness in the 
review of executive action as a stand-alone requirement under the principle of legality. Masetlha does not stand 
for this unequivocal proposition, however. The decision was limited to the specific context of that case and the 
power under consideration: the distinguishing feature which rendered the observance of procedural fairness 
inapposite in that case was “the special legal relationship that obtains between the President as head of the 
National Executive, on the one hand, and the Director-General of an intelligence agency, on the other”.The 
sensitive nature of this special relationship, lying as it did in the heartland of “the effective pursuit of national 
security”, meant that Mr Masetlha, the spymaster-in-chief, could continue to occupy his position only as long as 
he enjoyed the trust of the President, his principal. Moreover, the power to appoint and dismiss in Masetlha was 
“conferred specially upon the President for the effective business of government and . . . for the effective pursuit 
of national security”.’ 
 
In any event, the Constitutional Court then pointed out, in Albutt it has accepted that 
‘procedural fairness obligations may attach independently of a statutory obligation in virtue 
of the principle of legality’.211  
 
Although it was not strictly necessary to decide this issue, the Constitutional Court 
concluded, it was important to note that ‘our law has a long tradition – which was established 
by this Court in Mohammed – of strongly entrenching audi alteram partem (‘hear the other 
side’), which attains particular force when prejudicial allegations are levelled against an 
individual. And it is for this reason that dismissal from service has been recognised as a 
decision that attracts the requirements of procedural fairness’.212 
 
3.4.3 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa: The minority judgment 
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Unlike the majority judgment in Masetlha, the minority judgment held that the President’s 
decision to dismiss Mr Masetlha could be reviewed on the grounds that it was procedurally 
unfair. In arriving at this decision, the minority judgment held that the principle of legality 
does not only provide that every exercise of public power must be both lawful and rational, in 
addition it also provides that every exercise of public power must also be “fair”, including the 
President’s decision to dismiss Mr Masetlha: 
  
‘It is a fundamental principle of fairness that those who exercise public power must act fairly. In my view, the 
rule of law imposes a duty on those who exercise executive powers not only to refrain from acting arbitrarily, 
but also to act fairly when they make decisions that adversely affect an individual.’213  
 
The reason why every exercise of public power must be fair, the minority judgment held 
further, is because the Constitution is not just a formal document. Instead, it is a living 
document that embodies a normative and objective value system one of which is fairness. 
Like lawfulness and rationality, therefore, the duty to act fairly should govern every exercise 
of public power, including once again the President’s decision to dismiss Mr Masetlha.214  
 
In addition, the minority judgment went on to hold, the rationality requirement has both a 
substantive and a procedural requirement.215 The substantive requirement provides that the 
decision should be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, while the 
procedural requirements provides that the process by which the decision was made should 
also be rationally connected to the purpose for which the power was given.216 The procedural 
requirement imposes a duty to act fairly. If the procedural requirement was not included 
‘executive decisions which [had] been arrived at by a procedure which was clearly unfair 
[would be immune] from review.’217 
 
After setting out these principles, the minority judgment turned to apply them to the facts and 
found that the President had failed to follow a fair procedure before deciding to dismiss Mr 
Masetlha. This is because he did not give him a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations. The President’s decision, therefore, infringed the principle of legality and 
was unconstitutional and invalid.  
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The following comments may be made with respect to the judgment in Motau. 
 
First, instead of simply overruling the judgment in Masetlha, the Court in Motau chose to 
read it in a very narrow manner. It did this by focussing on the national security aspect of the 
case. I don’t think that this is an accurate reading of Masetlha and it certainly is not an 
accurate reading of ARMSA. In both those cases, the Court adopted a general and not a 
specific rule about executive action. In both cases the Court held that executive action as a 
whole cannot be reviewed on the grounds of procedural fairness. It did not hold that only 
executive action which deals with national security cannot be reviewed on the grounds of 
national security. 
 
Second, this inaccurate and narrow reading of the Masetlha cases indicates that the Court 
might not be willing to overrule the judgments in Masetlha and ARMSA directly. Instead, 
what it might do is confine them to the facts of their cases and then hold that in all other cases 
executive action may be reviewed on the grounds that it is procedurally unfair. We will have 
to wait and see how this jurisprudence develops. 
 
Third, while the move towards accepting procedural fairness certainly addresses the 
criticisms levelled against Masetlha, it also raises difficult separation of powers questions. 
This is because it adds another ground on which the courts may now review executive 
decisions in politically sensitive cases. In addition, it is not always clear what sorts of 
obligations procedural fairness may impose on the President and other members of the 
executive. This will inevitably draw the courts into more and more confrontations with the 




The move towards a broader approach almost came to fruition in Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans v Motau.218 In this case the Constitutional Court suggested, without 
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actually deciding that executive action could in fact be reviewed on the grounds that it is 
procedurally unfair. This chapter has shown a progression in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court towards the adoption of procedural fairness as a separate and self-
standing ground of review for executive action under the rule of law. At first stage the 
Constitutional Court was unwilling to accept procedural fairness as a separate and self-
standing ground of review for executive action under the rule of law stating that it should be 
reserved only for administrative action.219 There was also a second stage that represents a 
version of the broader approach which accepted ‘procedural rationality’, but the most 
important of these is the last approach which represents the ‘acceptance of procedural 
fairness’ as a self-standing requirement. In the next chapter we will turn to investigate the 
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As we saw in Chapter Three, the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Motau addresses many 
of the criticisms levelled against its judgment in Masetlha. At the same time, however, it also 
raises difficult separation of powers questions. This is because it adds another ground on 
which the courts may now review executive decisions in politically sensitive cases. In 
addition, it is not always clear what sorts of obligations procedural fairness imposes on the 
President and other members of the executive. This will inevitably draw the courts into more 
and more confrontations with the President and the other members of the executive. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the difficult separation of powers questions that the 
inclusion of procedural fairness as a separate and self-standing ground of review for 
executive decisions under the rule of law may give rise to. 
 
4.2 The origin of the doctrine of the separation of powers 
 
The origin of the doctrine of separation of powers doctrine may be traced back to the English 
philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704), who argued that the power of the state should be 
divided into legislative, executive and foreign relations functions.220  The modern version of 
the doctrine, however, is usually associated with the French philosopher, Charles 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), who argued that the power of the state should be divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial functions and then allocated to different or separate 
branches of the state, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.221   
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers is based on the idea that the abuse of power, and 
especially the abuse of power by the state, is more likely to occur when power is concentrated 
in the hands of a single individual or body or organ of state. In other words, to prevent the 
abuse of power and enhance the freedom of the individual, the doctrine therefore argues, it 
should be divided into different categories and allocated to different individuals or bodies or 
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organs of state, each of which may be held accountable for the manner in which they exercise 
their powers.222 
 
In his book, L’Espirit de Lois, Montesquieu explains the rationale behind the doctrine of the 
separation of powers in the following terms: ‘[a]ll would be in vain if the same person, or the 
same body of officials, be it the nobility or the people, were to exercise these three powers: 
that of making laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging crimes or 
disputes of individuals’.223 A bit later in the same work, he explains the rationale in the 
following similar terms: ‘when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty’.224 
 
Apart from imposing restrictions on the manner in which the state may exercise its power, the 
doctrine of the separation of powers is also regarded as a source of that power.225 
Labuschagne, for example, argues that the separation of powers is both a constraint and a 
source of government authority: 
 
‘One of the oldest dicta on restricted authority (the doctrine of the separation of powers) entails that the freedom 
of the citizens of a state can be ensured only by a division of centralised institutionalised power, because the 
centralisation of power can potentially lead to abuse. This division of authority is achieved by a structural and 
functional separation of government's authority into legislative, executive and judicial branches’.226 
 
4.3 The elements of the doctrine of the separation of powers 
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers has evolved in the years that have passed since 
Locke and Montesquieu introduced it and today it is usually divided into four principles, 
namely: the principle of trias politica; the principle of the separation of functions; the 
principle of the separation of personnel; and the principle of checks and balances.227  
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 The principle of trias politica simply provides that the state should be formally 
divided into three branches, namely: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.228  
 
 The principle of the separation of functions provides that each of the three branches of 
the state may exercise only those powers and functions that have been conferred upon 
it and may not exercise any other powers.229 
 
 The principle of the separation of personnel provides that each of the three branches 
of the state must be composed of separate and distinct groups of people and that there 
may be no overlapping membership.230 
 
 The principle of checks and balances provides that one branch can be held 
accountable by the other branches to check the exercise of power by that branch. In 
certain circumstances, this allows one branch to ‘veto’ the actions taken by another 
branch. This principle was introduced by the drafters of the United States 
Constitution.231 
 
Although the first three principles form an important part of the modern doctrine of the 
separation of powers is based, it is generally accepted that no constitutional system applies all 
of them strictly. This is because it is not possible to apply these principles strictly while also 
applying the principle of checks and balances, which ‘anticipates the necessary or 
unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another’.232 
 
4.4 The principle of checks and balances  
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The origins of the fourth principle are usually traced back to the Constitution of 
Massachusetts which was adopted in 1780 and which was written largely by John Adams 
(1735-1826).233 Apart from drafting the Massachusetts Constitution he also helped draft the 
Declaration of Independence and was the second president of the United States.  
 
One of the key questions that Adams and the other drafters faced was how best to ensure that 
the state does not abuse the power that has been conferred upon it. The answer he came up 
with was the idea of an independent judiciary staffed with impartial judges to serve as a 
crucial check on the political branches of government.234 
 
Article XXIX of the Massachusetts Constitution provides in this respect that: 
 
‘It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property and character, that 
there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be 
tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the 
best policy, but for the security of the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the supreme 
judicial court should hold their office as long as they behave themselves well; and that they should have 
honourable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws’. 
 
Article XXX went on to provide that: 
 
‘In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and 
judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either 
of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it 
may be a government of laws and not of men.’ 
 
One of the consequences that flowed from Adams’s idea of an independent judiciary staffed 
with impartial judges is that the judiciary lost its inferior status (Montesquieu did not think 
the judiciary was as important as the other two branches), and the overarching principle of 
checks and balances was created.235  
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Although both the legislature and the executive act as a check against the abuse of power by 
the other branches of government, it is the judiciary that plays the most important role in this 
respect and that gives the principle of checks and balances its greatest value. The judiciary 
acts as a check on the abuse of power most commonly through the power of judicial review 
of legislative and executive action.  
 
The power of judicial review is the power allocated to the courts to test laws and conduct 
against the provisions of the Constitution and to declare them to be unconstitutional and 
invalid if they conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and that conflict cannot be 
justified in an open and democratic society. It is an essential feature of a constitutional 
democracy. 
 
In order to function as an effective check on the abuse of power by the other branches of 
government, however, the judiciary has to be, and has to be seen to be, independent and 
staffed by impartial judges. Judicial independence, therefore, forms an important part of the 
principle of checks and balances, in particular, and of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, in general.  
 
4.5 The doctrine of the separation of powers in South Africa 
 
4.5.1 The separation of powers prior to 1994 
 
Prior to 1993 the doctrine of the separation of powers was applied in the context of a system 
of parliamentary sovereignty. As Dicey has pointed out, a system of parliamentary 
sovereignty is one in which parliament has ‘the right to make or unmake any law whatever, 
and further that no person or body is recognised by the law . . .  as having a right to override 
or set aside the legislation of parliament’. 236 
 
As this statement by Dicey indicates, one of the consequences that flows from a system of 
parliamentary supremacy for the doctrine of the separation of powers is that the judiciary 
cannot review or restrict the powers of parliament.237 This is because there are no legal 
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grounds on which parliamentary sovereign authority may be limited or restricted.238 
Parliament, and following the introduction of the party system, the executive were all 
powerful.239 This, of course, severely undermined the principle of checks and balances.240 
 
Given the points set out above, it is not surprising that the 1909 Union Constitution did not 
provide for a substantive separation of powers and that the 1961 Republican Constitution 
expressly excluded substantive judicial review thereby striking a hard blow on the separation 
of powers.241 This Constitution affirmed the supremacy of Parliament and expressly stated, 
no court could declare an Act of Parliament to be invalid unless it related to language 
rights.242 The courts, therefore, could only review Acts of Parliament in terms of the 
procedure that was followed to enact them and not in terms of their substantive content.  
 
In colonial and apartheid South Africa, therefore, the doctrine of the separation of powers 
was restricted largely to the principle of trias politica and the principle of the separation of 
personnel between the legislative and executive branches, on the one hand, and the judicial 
branch, on the other.243 Given that the courts could only review Acts of Parliament rule in 
terms of the procedure that was followed to enact them and not in terms of their substantive 
content, the judiciary could only place temporary obstacles in the way of the legislature. If 
Parliament disagreed with the approach adopted by the courts it could simply amend the 
Constitution or defeat the interpretation of the courts.244 In Collins v Minister of the 
Interior,245 the Appellate Division summed up the powers of the courts when it stated that 
‘[ilf the provisions of a law are clear, we, as a court, are not concerned with the propriety of 
the legislation or policy of the Legislature, our duty is to minister and interpret it as we find 
it’.246  
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Although neither the interim Constitution nor the Constitution expressly refers to the doctrine 
of the separation of powers, Constitutional Principle VI provided that there had to be ‘a 
separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with 
appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness’ and 
the Constitutional Court has confirmed on a number of occasions that this doctrine does 
indeed form a part of South Africa’s constitutional system.247 
 
In SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath,248 for example, the Constitutional 
Court held that the existence of the doctrine of the separation of powers in South Africa may 
be derived from the wording and the structure of the Constitution: 
 
‘In the first certification judgment this Court held that the provisions of our Constitution are structured in a way 
that makes provision for a separation of powers. In the Western Cape case249 it enforced that separation by 
setting aside a proclamation of the President on the grounds that the provision of the Local Government 
Transition Act250, under which the President had acted in promulgating the Proclamation, was inconsistent with 
the separation of powers required by the Constitution, and accordingly invalid. It has also commented on the 
constitutional separation of powers in other decisions. There can be no doubt that our Constitution provides for 
such a separation, and that laws inconsistent with what the Constitution requires in this regard, are invalid’.251 
 
And in Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the RSA,252 the Court reaffirmed that 
the existence of the doctrine of the separation of powers may be derived from the structure of 
the Constitution: 
 
‘The principle of the separation of powers emanates from the wording and structure of the Constitution. The 
Constitution delineates between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This Court recognised a 
fundamental principle of the new constitutional text as being “a separation of powers between the Legislature, 
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Executive and Judiciary with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness”’.253 
 
Apart from finding that the doctrine of the separation of powers forms a part of South 
Africa’s constitutional system, the Constitutional Court has also held that the principle of 
checks and balances forms a part of the South African doctrine of the separation of powers. 
An important consequence of this approach, the Court has held further, is that the separation 
of powers in South Africa can never be absolute and that one branch will inevitably intrude 
on the functional independence of another.254 
 
In the First Certification Judgment,255 for example, the Constitutional Court held that:  
 
‘There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers and, in democratic systems of government in 
which checks and balances result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of government upon another, 
there is no separation that is absolute.256  . . . The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises 
the functional independent of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of checks and balances 
focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a totality, prevents the branches of 
government from usurping power from one another. In this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable 
intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of 
powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation’.257 
 
And in De Lange v Smuts NO,258 the Constitutional Court repeated these points and then went 
on to hold that: 
 
‘. . . over time our Courts will develop a distinctly South African model of separation of powers, one that fits the 
particular system of government provided for in the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed 
both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the one hand, to control 
government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power 
so completely that the government is unable to take timely measures in the public interest’.259 
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Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2013 (10) BCLR 1159 (CC) para 13. 
255 First Certification Judgment 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
256 First Certification Judgment 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 108. 
257 First Certification Judgment 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 109. 
258 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC). 
259 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 60. 
69 
 
The fact that the Constitutional Court has accepted that the separation of powers in South 
Africa can never be absolute indicates that it has adopted a functionalist rather than a 
formalist approach towards the doctrine of the separation of powers. Before turning to 
consider what this means for the Court’s relationship with the other two branches of 
government, it will be helpful to briefly discuss each of these approaches in turn. 
 
(b) The formalistic approach 
 
The first theory resembles the structural separation of powers as advanced by Montesquieu. 
This theory is founded on the notion that the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are 
inherently distinguishable and completely separate.260 The theory can also be called the pure 
theory (Montesquian theory) of the separation of powers.261  
 
The theoretical separation of powers was in force in South Africa during the times of the 
apartheid government. Prior to the Constitution there was only a formal or structural 
separation of powers. This separation was limited only to the classification and distinction of 
government organs into the executive, parliament and the judiciary. Any interference 
(substantial or institutional) with the other organs was prohibited.  If there was conflict 
between any of the organs of state, the pre-held classification of competencies are the ones 
that identified whether the task at hand was judicial, executive or legislative and the inquiry 
exhausted here.262 Once the class was identified then the task was handed over or allocated to 
the appropriate Institution with no interference from any other organ of state. 
 
This theory has been criticised on a number of different grounds. Among these are the 
following: 
 
First, Cachalia criticised this approach or form of separation of powers stating that it can no 
longer curb the agent demand of the modern democratic government and a state that has 
become more administrative.263 Carolan in his book The New Separation of Powers: A 
Theory of the Modern Sate expounds clearly on the short comings of the formalistic 
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approach. He states in this book that this pure Montesquian model has not been wholly 
reproduced in any institutional design of any modern state.264 
 
Carolan continues with the critic and states that this pure theory of the separation of powers is 
‘practically impossible and an undesirable mode of government.265 It would be difficult, the 
argument continues, to subject public bodies to such an ‘austere’ independence of the organs 
that there is no interaction since corporation and coordination are essential for any 
government to function cohesively.266 An understanding of the arguments of the critics boil 
down to the idea that overlap between the branches is inevitable. 
 
A further criticism of the approach is that it is too indeterminate.267 It involves a lot of 
definition and distinction of what is executive and how it is different from legislative and 
Judiciary, a task which he argues, the court will struggle to do.268 Although the formalistic 
theory is easy to explain it is too abstract and difficult to apply because of its indeterminacy 
which makes it difficult to establish what it enjoins in a particular individual case.269 
Carolana reaches the conclusion that the formalist theory is in fact so indeterminate that it is 
ultimately devoid of any practical efficacy.’270  
 
Before visiting the second approach it is essential that I point to the fact that the short 
comings of the formalistic approach and the criticisms thereof do not mean that the approach 
is totally irrelevant and of no value. This is because the Montesquian tripartite theoretical 
division of government is still influential and useful as a guiding principle of the distribution 
of power between the branches.271 Where the critics seem to place their arguments most is on 
the mechanics of the operation of the doctrine, that the formalist approach does not assist on 
how the separation of power should practically be applied.272 The short-falls of the formalist 
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approach is the reason why South Africa is now in the post-formalist period of the separation 
of powers. 
 
Besides the exception that the theory is relevant, the formalist approach remains too 
theoretical, prompting one critic to state that: ‘a political philosopher can produce a utopian 
vision of the ideal world, uncluttered by the limitations inherent in human endeavour. A 
Utopian Constitutional ideal on the one hand is a waste of time.’273 It can be concluded 
therefore that spending too much time on this theory is a waste of time. 
 
The second theory helps to an extent that it fills the lacuna that the formalist approach leaves 
by providing for far more workable formulation of the separation of powers that can be 
applied in practice. 
 
(c) The functionalist approach 
 
The second theory of the separation of powers is the functionalist theory which recognises a 
system of checks and balances allowing for an intrusion of one branch of state into the 
competencies or domain of the other.274 Although the Constitutional Court in the 
Certification Judgment accepted that there is functional independence of the branches of 
government, it pointed further and importantly that there is no absolute separation of 
power.275 The theory lies on the important notion of inter-institutional balance of power, 
acknowledging that it is impractical to have neatly divided pockets of power in 
government.276 This approach seeks to ensure that no one body assumes too much power and 
it follows post 1994 approach to the separation of powers.277 
 
If there is a foreign Constitution that put this theory well; it is the Constitution of Hemisphere 
that states that: 
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‘[t]he Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from and independent of each 
other  as the nature of free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the 
whole fabric of the Constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity.’278 
 
According to Berendth separation of power is not merely a formal organisation of state 
power. To this author, the separation of powers seeks to protect the rights of individuals that 
is given by the Constitution. He continues to argue that the separation of powers seeks to 
prevent the accumulation of power in one branch of government. In this breath the author 
argues that Constitutional Courts gives teeth to the separation of powers to try and achieve 
these objectives and this is what is called the functionalist approach to the separation of 
powers.279 Interaction between the different organs is therefore inevitable. 
 
The functionalist approach can be traced as far back as 1995 in the case of Executive Council 
Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa280 where the provincial 
government was challenging the decision by the legislature to assign plenary legislative 
powers to the national executive. Here the court argued the most basic assumptions of the 
separation of powers and stated that the executive would not be allowed to exercise plenary 
legislative powers. However Parliament could delegate to the Executive subordinate law-
making powers.281 The decision showed that there are limits to what powers Parliament could 
delegate to the national executive and their core function of absolute law- making was one 
power that could not delegate. The case showed that the courts are willing to interfere with 
the decisions of the other organs of state therefore separation was not absolute but functional. 
 
The above case illustrates that the fundamental principle of the separation of powers that 
allows intervention between branches of government. The supremacy clause allows for 
intrusion and intervention since the court can test every exercise of public power by public 
officials and organs of state for constitutional consistency. Intervention is therefore 
inevitable. 
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The provision that any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid therefore 
encourages checks and balances consequently interference.282 The courts on interpreting the 
Constitution can set aside a decision or declare an Act of Parliament inconsistent with the 
Constitution thereby checking the power of government.283 As stated in the Western Cape 
case that is discussed above, the Court showed its willingness to balance power between the 
executive and parliament when it stated that parliament could not assign plenary legislative 
powers.284 By making such a judgment the court interfered with the powers of the legislative 
branch by citing the extent of their powers. 
 
In the First Certification Judgment the Court found that, although there is functional 
independence in South Africa, there is no absolute separation.285 It went further to state that 
there is always partial separation.286 This is why the court held in the International Trade 
Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) ltd case that the separation of powers 
in the Constitution is distinctively a South African design.287 This design is functionalist in 
nature since there is no universal model for the separation of powers.288 It does not mean 
however that the functionalist approach is perfect and can solve all problems. 
 
The functionalist theory also has its own criticisms. It is criticised for its reliance on the 
fanciful imagination that functionalism can define the notion of institutional balance.289 It is 
so difficult to come up with what ‘balance’ entails in the sense of how much power should be 
given to each organ and how much intrusion should be allowed in order not to usurp the 
powers of the other organs. To this end, the theory also faces the same problem of 
indeterminacy. Carolan argues that using such an approach the courts have become more 
reactionary than prescriptive in discharging their roles as there is no set standard of balancing 
powers. The consequences of the absence of a ‘comprehensive curial guidelines’ is that cases 
are heard on an ad hoc basis and each case is treated as if it is the first of its kind.290 
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It seems in the final analysis that both theories are affected by indeterminacy since it is 
difficult to define most of the aspects of the doctrine which leaves the court ‘to supplement 
by their own intuitive choice of independent criteria’.291 The Court following the 
Constitutional text prefers the functionalist approach since ‘checks and balances’ allow for 
intrusion.  We therefore move on to discuss the checks and balances and the principle of how 
the Court should engage in its review duties. 
 




Apart from finding that the principle of checks and balances forms a part of the South African 
doctrine of the separation of powers, the Constitutional Court has found that the power of 
judicial review and the independence of the courts form a key part of the South African 
principle of checks and balances. 
 
Once again, in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath:292 
 
‘[t]he separation required by the Constitution between the legislature and the executive, on the one hand, and the 
courts, on the other, must be upheld, otherwise the role of the courts as an independent arbiter of issues 
involving the division of powers between the various parts of government, and the legality of legislative and 
executive action measured against the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitution, will be 
undermined’.293 
 
And in Justice Alliance of SA v President of the RSA the Court held that:294 
 
‘Judicial independence is crucial to the courts for the fulfilment of their constitutional role. It is ‘foundational to 
and indispensable for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of 
law’. What is vital to judicial independence is that “the judiciary should enforce the law impartially and that it 
should function independently of the legislature and the executive”.’ 295 
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Although the power of judicial review and the independence of the courts have been accepted 
as a part of South Africa’s system of checks and balances, the power of judicial review has 
been criticised by some commentators who argue that it is contrary to democratic principles. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss what democracy is, but our working 
definition will loosely be that democracy is a system where the government of the day is 
elected (with the legislature directly elected and the executive indirectly elected) into power 
by a system of regular elections that are free.296  
 
Consequent to such election the government is the representative of the general populace to 
whom they are accountable to even if they can be voted out of power in the next election. 
Elections give the legislature and the executive their democratic legitimacy and the decisions 
and actions that they perfume are generally accepted on this basis.297 South Africa has a 
system of representative democracy and the political organs find their legitimacy in their 
representative nature of the majority of the population of South Africa. 
 
Opposition to judicial review is therefore based on the fact that in a democracy, the leaders of 
the day should be elected by the people. The judiciary is not elected and therefore is deficient 
of this democratic legitimacy. The lack of democratic legitimacy in the institution of the 
judiciary leads to a dilemma which Dennis Davis summarises as follows: 
 
‘[c]onstitutional review is conducted by unelected judges who are empowered to overturn the will of a 
democratically elected and accountable legislature in terms of a process of interpreting abstract constitutional 
provisions. In short, the question arises as to how to account for and justify the curtailment of the operation of a 
democratic political system by an unaccountable institution’.298 
 
Taking the above quote into account, the precise submission is that by allowing for judicial 
review the Constitution allows for the subversion of democracy.299 The political will of the 
people as represented by the legislature and the executive can in this instance be subverted by 
an unelected group of people in the person of Constitutional Court Judges through judicial 
review. This clash between the will of the people and the duties of the judiciary is the one 
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that leads to the counter-majoritarian dilemma.300 On one hand the courts have the duty to 
dispense with their constitutional mandate and on the other hand they have to respect the 
political branches of state since they represent the will of the majority.  
 
As Freedman has pointed out, the manner in which the courts in constitutional democracies 
have responded to these criticisms may be divided into two categories: first, the non-
justiciable approach; and, second, the judicial self-restraint approach.301 
 
4.6.2 The non-justiciable approach 
 
In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, the courts have adopted what is referred to as 
a ‘non-justiciable approach’ or ‘political questions doctrine’. In terms of this  approach the 
courts have held that certain disputes, especially those that are politically sensitive, should be 
resolved by the political branches, rather than by the judicial branch. This is because the 
separation of powers provides that political decisions should be made by the elected political 
authorities and not by the courts. 
 
The origins of the non-justiciable approach may be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall’s 
judgment in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison,302 where he said the following:  
 
“[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or 
executive officers, perform duties in which they have discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in this court”.303 
 
In terms of this approach it is important to be able to distinguish between those disputes 
which may be classified as “political” (or non-justiciable) and those which may not be 
classified as “political” (or justiciable). This issue has been considered by the United States 
Supreme Court on a number of occasions. The leading judgment in this respect, however, is 
Baker v Carr 396 US 186 (1962). 
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In Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962), the Supreme Court explained that a matter will be a 
political question if: (a) the constitution itself has allocated the issue to another branch of 
government; (b) there are no legal principles in terms of which the dispute may be resolved; 
(c) the issue cannot be resolved without first making a political decision; (d) a court cannot 
resolve the dispute without showing a lack of respect for the political branches; and (e) 
conflicting decisions from the different branches of government would cause embarrassment. 
 
In recent times the Supreme Court has held that the procedures followed by Congress when it 
impeaches a judge or when it impeaches the president are political questions (see Nixon v 
United States 506 US 224 (1973)). In addition, the Supreme Court has also held that the 
president’s authority over foreign affairs and, in particular his power to terminate treaties, or 
to commit troops to battle, are political questions (see Goldwater v Carter 444 US 996 
(1979)). 
 
4.6.3 The judicial self-restraint approach 
 
In other jurisdictions, such as South Africa, the courts have not developed a political question 
doctrine. This is usually because the constitution itself makes it clear that every exercise of 
public power is subject to judicial review. Section 2 of the South African Constitution, for 
example, provides that “[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; land and 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. 
 
The mere fact that the Constitutional Court is willing to deal with ‘political questions’, 
however, does not mean that it is willing to overstep the limits of its designated authority and 
take over the powers and functions that have been allocated to the political branches of 
government. It simply means that the Constitutional Court has developed different 
approaches to determining the limits of its power over the political branches of government 
and thus managing its relationship with them. 
 
The approach adopted by the Constitutional Court may be referred to as the ‘judicial self-
restraint approach’. In terms of this approach the Constitutional Court uses a number of 
different strategies to determine how far it is willing to intrude into the functions that have 
been reserved for the political branches. As a general rule, the more political a particular 
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issue is, the less willing the Court is to intrude; or, to put it another way, the more political an 
issue is, the more restrained the Court will be. 
 
Navot describes the judicial self-restraint approach as follows: 
 
‘As mentioned, Israeli law did not adopt the American approach of the non-justiciability of political questions. 
The foremost spokesman for the Israeli “self-restraint” approach was Supreme Court former President Aharon 
Barak. According to Barak, any act is liable to be “caught” by the legal norm, and there is no act for which there 
is no applicable legal norm. There is no “legal vacuum”, in which acts are performed without the law taking a 
position on them. The law spans all actions. Barak’s view is that the nature of the act – political or other – is 
irrelevant. Every act, whether political or a matter of determining policy, is contained within the world of law, 
and is subject to a legal norm. 
 
According to the Israeli approach, the political nature of an act does not negate its legal nature, but the legal 
character of the executing body will affect the nature of the rules applied by the court. In the words of Justice 
Barak: ‘The judiciary assesses the legal aspects of politics, not its wisdom. Accordingly, when a judge assesses 
the legality of a political determination, he is not concerned, neither positively nor negatively – with the merits 
of the determination. He does not make himself part of it. He does not assess its internal logic, but only 
examines its legality according to legal standards. In doing so he fulfils his classic role’. 
 
It bears mention that Justice Barak disagrees with Justice Brennan’s comments in Baker v Carr. Hence, 
regarding the first example, i.e that the determination of the question is largely in the realm of the political 
authority, Justice Barak argues for a distinction between (a) the legal question of the jurisdiction of the political 
authority and whether the jurisdictions was lawfully exercised, and (b) the question of whether the political 
authority chose the appropriate solution from among a number of lawful solutions. 
 
“Determination of the first question (a) is generally the role of the court, within the context of its power and duty 
to determine the nature of the statute. When a particular statute empowers a governmental authority, it thereby 
empowers the court to interpret it, determine its scope, and to decide whether its power was lawfully exercised. 
Hence submission of a particular act to governmental authority does not mean that the issue of the lawfulness of 
that act was also submitted to the governmental authority”.’304 
 
Amongst the different strategies that the Constitutional Court has adopted are the following: 
(a) exploiting doctrinal gaps; (b) adopting different standards of review; and (c) designing 
different remedies. Each of these will be briefly discussed in turn. 
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(a)  Insofar as the first strategy is concerned, Roux argues that at this stage in South 
Africa’s constitutional development it is not always clear which sections of the 
Constitution applies to a particular problem. In addition, it is not always clear what 
some of terms set out in the Constitution mean, for example, the phrase “rule of law” 
in section 1 or the phrase “multi-party democracy”. These doctrinal gaps, he argues 
further, provide the Constitutional Court with a great deal of flexibility and the Court 
has used this flexibility to manage its relationship with the political branches.305 
 
(b)  Insofar as the second strategy is concerned, Roux argues that when it comes to testing 
the constitutional validity of a decision taken by the other branches of government, 
the Constitutional Court has adopted a wide range of standards. Some of these favour 
the government (for example the test for rationality), while others do not (for example 
the test for reasonableness). When the issue is a politically sensitive one, he argues 
further, the Court will usually adopt a test that favours the government.306 
 
(c)  Insofar as the third strategy is concerned, Roux argued that when the Constitutional 
Court has come to the conclusion that a decision taken by the other branches of 
government is constitutionally invalid, it often adopts a remedy aimed at avoiding 
conflict between itself and the other branches, for example it might refer an invalid 
Act back to Parliament to correct, or it might issue an order which simply declares 
that the government has acted in an unconstitutional manner without actually 
instructing the government to take any specific steps, or it might issue an order 
instructing the government to take specific steps, but without actually supervising the 
manner in which the government has complied with its order.307 
 
The decision in a particular case, Roux argues further, often depends on the particular 
strategy the Constitutional Court has adopted and the Court’s decision to adopt a particular 
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strategy is not based purely on legal principles and rules. Instead, it is sometimes based on 
pragmatic considerations, especially in those cases that have a strong political dimension and, 




In light of the discussion set out above, the following comments may be made: 
 
First, that the judgment in Masetlha is an example of judicial self-restraint. Like the decision 
to adopt rationality rather than reasonableness as the standard of review in terms of the 
principle of legality, it may be argued that the decision to exclude executive action from the 
requirements of procedural fairness was a strategy adopted by the Court in order to ensure 
that it did not overstep the limits of its authority. 
 
Second, an important consequence of analysing the Masetlha judgment in this way is that it 
may be argued that the judgment was not based purely on the application of legal principles 
and rules, but rather on pragmatic considerations. Given the politically sensitive nature of 
executive decisions, and especially those made by the President, it is not surprising that 
separation of powers concerns and the need to show appropriate deference to the executive 
weighed very heavily with the Constitutional Court in these cases.308 
 
Third, the fact that the approach adopted in Masetlha was so obviously based on pragmatic 
considerations, rather than on the application of legal principles gave rise to a great deal of 
criticism from academic and other commentators. The strong negative reaction from the 
academic community arose out of the fact that the legal principles governing procedural 
fairness and their application to dismissals were very well settled in South Africa before this 
case. In addition, the decision to exclude executive action from the requirements of 
procedural fairness was set out in very wide terms (it was not limited to the facts of the case) 
and poorly motivated. 
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Fourth, the almost universal negative reaction to the judgment was problematic for the 
Constitutional Court. This is because while the Court does have to take pragmatic 
considerations into account when it manages its relations with the political branches 
especially in politically sensitive cases, it cannot be seen to be basing its decision purely on 
pragmatic considerations. It has to base, or at least appear to base, its decision on legal 
principles. If it simply bases its decision on pragmatic and not legal considerations, then it 
will start to lose its legitimacy as a legal and not a political body. 
 
Fifth, the criticisms levelled by academic and other commentators against the Masetlha 
judgment suggest an alternative approach. One in which the Constitutional Court can deal 
with these sorts of cases in a principled manner, but without overstepping its authority. This 
alternative approach provides that the Court should accept that executive action is subject to 
the requirements of procedural fairness, but given that procedural fairness is a flexible 
concept, the actual obligations that are imposed on the President and other members of the 
executive when they make executive decisions should be kept to an absolute minimum.  
 
Finally, it is submitted that the judgment in Motau indicates the Constitutional Court itself is 
coming around to this way of thinking. It seems that the Court itself has realised that the 
strategy it adopted in Masetlha has not been particularly effective and that it needs to find a 
new approach. An important consequence of this is that in future judgments we will most 
probably see a move towards adopting procedural fairness (although the Court might call it 
procedural rationality in order to avoid directly overruling Masetlha), but that the actual 




In this chapter we have seen that the separation of powers has proved phenomenal in South 
Africa’s constitutional era. It is supported by its historical necessity as indicated by the 
consequences of stifling it during Apartheid. Of the basic principles of separation of powers 
we have established that the system of checks and balances is the most important. Under this 
system of checks and balances we noted the importance of judicial review generally and 
constitutional review specifically. There are criticisms for the court’s role of judicial review 
usually coming in the form of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. It has been established that 
the Constitutional Court has mechanisms in place to deal with these challenges one of these 
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being judicial self-restraint. We noted that whilst dealing with cases that involved procedural 
fairness under the rule of law the Court has tried to use this mechanism of restraint in order to 
maintain the separation of powers. The next Chapter, therefore, will analyse the approach of 
the Constitutional Court in relation to whether procedural fairness is a part of legality. This 
analysis will be done in relation to the principles contained in the doctrine of the separation of 



































As we have seen the principle of legality is a source of review power and an antecedent of the 
rule of law. Under this review power the courts have the power to review any exercise of 
public power, including the exercise of executive power. As a source of review power it 
encompasses most of the grounds of review found under administrative law, with the 
exception of procedural fairness. We established what procedural fairness is and we noted 
that it encompasses the principles of natural justice, namely the right to be heard and the rule 
against bias.  
 
We went further in the previous chapters to look at the cases that tried to answer the question 
of whether there is hope for procedural fairness under the principle of legality. It was 
discovered that the Constitutional Court has taken three approaches to this question. First, 
there is the ‘no to procedural fairness’ approach which rejected procedural fairness. Second, 
there is the ‘yes to procedural rationality approach’ which stated that procedural fairness is 
only acceptable if it assists in establishing the rationality of a decision. Third, there is the 
‘maybe yes to procedural fairness approach’ which is willing to adopt full blown procedural 
fairness under the doctrine of legality. 
 
Having found that the different approaches of the Constitutional Court were influenced by the 
principles that emanate from the doctrine of the separation of powers we went further to 
discuss it. We found that in South Africa there is a formal separation of powers where none 
of the three branches of government should disrupt or invade the powers of the others. This 
separation, however, is not absolute. This is because at a functional level the courts are given 
the power to review the powers of the other branches of government.  
 
However, when it comes to reviewing the more political powers of government (specifically 
the executive) there is a tensions which arises. This is because the Constitutional Court is an 
unelected body in a democratic state. The Constitutional Court, therefore, has devised ways 
in which to review decisions of a political nature without disrupting the separation of powers. 
One of these ways is the strategy of judicial self-restraint where the Court sets out its own 




This chapter seeks to analyse the Constitutional Court’s approach to procedural fairness 
under legality to establish whether it is in line with the rule of law and whether it respects the 
separation of powers. We shall look at the extent to which the Constitutional Court has stated 
that executive functions should comply with procedural fairness. We shall look at whether the 
Court’s approach is in keeping with the separation of powers. We shall also examine the 
arguments for procedural fairness and those against procedural fairness bearing in mind 
concerns about the separation of powers. 
 
5.2 What is the extent to which executive action should comply with procedural 
fairness? 
 
As we have stated, the Constitutional Court has adopted three approaches in an attempt to 
respond to the above question on the extent to which executive action should comply with 
procedural fairness. 
Just a brief recap we found that in the first approach, as represented by the cases of Masetlha 
and the ARMSA, the Constitutional Court took a strict approach that it would not adopt 
procedural fairness as a requirement when executive power is being exercised. Their main 
argument was that, because procedural fairness is essential to administrative law it did not 
find a place under the principle of legality.309 Suffice to note that the Court stated that 
procedural fairness is not one of the constraints under the principle of legality in both cases 
without giving concrete reasons why. We have already pointed out that the Court’s ‘special 
relationship’ is dubious since it is difficult to see how national security is affected by a 
hearing.310 
 
In the second stage, as represented by the Albutt and the DA case, the Constitutional Court 
warmed up a bit and followed a more liberal approach. At this stage the Court accepted that 
in certain circumstances procedural fairness could be accepted as a requirement of legality. 
The acceptance was conditional and the condition was that procedural fairness would be 
accepted if it would aid in meeting a stated government purpose.  It meant that if procedural 
                                                          
309 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 76 and Association of 
Regional Magistrates of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (7) BCLR 762 (CC) para 
59. 
310 C Hoexter ‘Clearing the Intersection? Administrative law and labour law in the Constitutional Court’ (2008) 
1 Constitutional Court Review 209. 
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fairness was the only means to affect the rationality of an executive action then the 
obligations of procedure would be imposed.311  
 
The third stage which represents the last approach took the acceptance of procedural fairness 
to a different level, as represented in the judgment of Motau and the minority judgment of 
Masethla.  In Motau the Constitutional Court imposed requirements of a fair procedure on the 
executive although there was statute to that effect. The Court went further to state that even if 
there had not been legislation that demanded procedural fairness, there still was nothing that 
could prevent it from imposing it.312 The same sentiment towards this approach was also 
endorsed by the minority of Masetlha.313 
 
Ngcobo J in the minority of the Masetlha case found that the President was supposed to give 
Mr Masethla a hearing and his failure to do so meant that his actions were contrary to the rule 
of law and therefore unconstitutional. On this he found that legality demands more than 
rationality but something more which he called the fundamental principle of fairness which 
places a duty to act fairly on the exercise of all public power. In summary he found that to 
dissociate procedural fairness from legality (the rule of law) would ‘result in executive 
decisions which have been arrived at by a procedure which was clearly unfair being immune 
from review.’314  
 
There is no other jurisprudence than that of the Motau and the Masetlha minority that has 
shown a willingness by the Constitutional Court to accept procedural constraints on executive 
power. This is the ‘maybe yes’ to procedural fairness. 
 
5.3 Analysing the Constitutional Court’s approach in light of the separation of powers 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
                                                          
311Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) para 59. In the Albutt case 
the Constitutional Court accepted that the victims should been heard simply because a hearing would further the 
government purpose which was national unity and national reconciliation. In Democratic Alliance v President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) para 39 the Court accepted that the failure to take relevant 
information into consideration meant that not only the process by which the decision was made, but also the 
decision itself was irrational. 
312 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 117. 
313 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 180- 83. For Ngcobo J the 
exercise of all power is subject to the Constitution which is the supreme law and has its constraints on the 
exercise of power which included the rule of law. 




There are a number of separation of powers concerns that are imputed to the imposition of 
procedural fairness on the executive. The first one is that procedural obligations are very 
onerous and they may demand too much from the executive. Such onerous obligations are 
feared to have the effect of affecting the separation of powers. This is because procedural 
fairness may hinder the effective running of government business as stated in the case of 
Masetlha that the powers of the President were given to him for the efficient running of 
government business. 
 
These arguments arise because of the more political nature of executive decisions. Under 
administrative law it has been held that procedural requirements will not be applicable in 
cases that are not administrative in nature.315 This excludes executive actions because of their 
political nature. De Ville states that the application of procedural fairness is directly linked to 
its content stating as if on a spectrum ‘[t]he closer a decision approximates the judicial 
process, the stricter the application of the requirements of procedural fairness. On the other 
end of the spectrum lie issues that are of a high policy nature. The closer one gets to this end 
of the spectrum, the more minimal the requirements of procedural fairness’.316 This assertion 
entails that the more political or policy related an issue is the less procedural obligations that 
should be imposed. 
 
5.3.2 The ‘yes to procedural rationality’ approach 
 
This approach seems to stand out since it is far away from the extremes of either accepting or 
not accepting procedural fairness under legality. Considering De Ville’s argument above that 
the more political a decision is the less procedural obligations the law should impose, the 
Albutt and Democratic Alliance cases seem to be on point. Whilst the Constitutional Court 
did not want to overrule the ‘no to procedural fairness approach’, it showed a wider form of 
deference to the executive thereby maintaining the separation of powers. The Court adopted a 
less strict strategy of accepting the lesser requirement of rationality rather than 
reasonableness or full procedure. As such the approach respected the separation of powers.  
 
                                                          
315 De Beer NO v North Central Local Council and South Central Local Council 2002 (1) SA 429 (CC) paras 
10-15. 
316 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Law in South Africa (2003) at 221. 
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A perfect example of taking the separation of powers into consideration was in the Albutt 
case. There was a fear in the case that imposing full procedural fairness would affect the 
efficient running of government business which in this case was the pardoning of offenders of 
politically motivated crimes. For the Constitutional Court to impose the obligations 
associated with the right to a fair procedure on the executive would be to impose a mammoth 
task on the executive. The argument goes that it would have been difficult for the President to 
adhere to every applicant’s requirement of notice and oral presentations and representation. 
This kind of requirement to impose on the exercise of every executive functions would be 
unjustifiable since the state’s capacity to hear every case would depend on a variety of factors 
like money, personnel and time. 
 
5.3.3 Arguments against the acceptance of procedural fairness and its separation of 
powers concerns. 
 
There are some arguments that support the ‘no to procedural fairness’ approach. Some of 
these arguments are included in the commentary of Masetlha in Chapter Three and will be 
highlighted here once more.  
 
Some of the arguments hinge around the separation of powers and one such argument is that 
to impose procedural obligations is undesirable as doing so would be to fetter the political 
discretion of the decision maker or hinder the effective running of government business.317  
That procedural fairness fetters political discretion is seen in the Masetlha case where the 
Constitutional Court stated that because of the special relationship that existed between the 
President and the Head of the National Intelligence Agency procedural fairness would 
shackle political power. This in the end would result in the courts unduly meddling into 
politics. A De Ville has stated obligations of procedural fairness need to be lessened as we 
get closer to policy decisions and decisions of a political nature.318 
 
Another separation of powers argument is that the exclusion of executive powers from the 
PAJA and therefore from administrative law constraints like procedural fairness was in order 
to respect the separation of powers. Respect for the separation of powers would be through 
                                                          
317 M Murcott ‘Procedural Fairness’ in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An introduction 
(2015) 167. 
318 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Law in South Africa (2003) at 221 
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insulating the more political organs, accordingly political issues of state, from judicial 
review, thereby insulating the courts from interfering in political issues. As such imposing 
administrative law obligations on the exercise of executive power would be untenable.319  
The hesitation to adopt procedural fairness just like that of unreasonableness under legality 
maintains the distinction between administrative and non-administrative issues. To demand 
procedural fairness will encourage the idea that there are two administrative justice systems 
running parallel to each other.  
 
As stated earlier, a further argument is that procedural fairness can impose onerous 
obligations on the executive like the notice of the hearing, the notice to defend, written oral 
submissions from all sides and even the possibility of appeal. These cumbersome obligations 
will mostly be in relation to the uncertainty of procedural fairness requirements.320 The bulky 
procedural obligations have been held to have the effect of disrupting the efficient running of 
government business.321  
 
The burdensome nature of obligations of a fair procedure is worsened by the fact that it is 
unclear how much of a hearing is required for the decisions.322 In some decisions, only a 
written submission can be enough, in some there may be required the full hearing with oral 
hearing and submissions from all the parties and this could clog and choke the efficient 
running of state business.323 
 
Also it has been submitted by some that the inclusion of procedural fairness may encourage 
judicial litigation rather than departmental hearings. This means that instead of the decisions 
being heard by public officials in their departmental disciplinary bodies, there may be 
preference by victims in favour of judicial litigation. Price states in this respect that judges 
are better placed to hear questions of procedural justice than public officials.324 Bearing in 
mind the judicial position of the courts it seems that they are better equipped to achieve or 
accomplish procedural fairness than the executive is. This ability is in regards to time, 
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324 A Price ‘Rationality review of legislation and executive decisions: Poverty Alleviation Network and Albutt’ 
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investigating officials and their ability to be impartial. Imposing procedural fairness therefore 
may encourage the usurpation of executive powers by the judiciary. 
 
There are also some theoretical arguments that have been put forth setting forth why the 
Constitutional Court should maintain a Masetlha like approach to the question of the 
separation of powers. The first argument is that procedural fairness introduces an element of 
uncertainty to the legality platform so it should not be adopted. Murcott observes that it is 
still unclear what the precise content of fairness is in those cases in which the Court has 
accepted the application of fairness principles under legality.325 So even if procedural fairness 
is adopted there is no certainty to what its content would be. It should be appreciated that 
such uncertainty is against principles of the rule of law.326 
 
Demanding procedural fairness for the exercise of executive actions has also been held to 
have the effect of blurring even further the already blurry distinction between administrative 
law and the rule of law. In fact some authors already refer to legality as ‘administrative law 
being called by another name’. 327  The absence of the requirement of procedural fairness had 
the effect of marking a distinction between legality review and review under administrative 
law. In this breath the acceptance of procedural fairness under legality will make distinction 
with administrative law even dimmer. This distinction or exclusion of executive powers from 
the PAJA is a way of holding the separation of power in esteem. 
 
5.3.4 Submissions for the acceptance of procedural fairness under legality 
 
The founding argument for those authors who support the acceptance of procedural fairness 
under legality is that it does not disrupt the separation of powers. The argument goes that 
procedural fairness on the spectrum of the rule of law is part of the formal version of the rule 
of law. This version of the rule of law does not venture into the substantive quality, 
wrongness or rightness of law but that the law should adhere to some set formal standards. As 
                                                          
325 M Murcott ‘Procedural Fairness as a component of legality: Is a reconciliation between Albutt and Masetlha 
Possible?’ (2013) 130 SALJ 260 269. 
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327 C Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in South African administrative law’ (2000) 117 SALJ 482 at 506. 
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such it is astonishing that one could argue that demanding such a formal requirement could 
affect or distort the separation of powers doctrine. 
 
More still, some authors disagree with the argument that procedural fairness imposes onerous 
burdens on the executive. They argue in this respect that procedural fairness does not 
necessarily impose onerous burdens because it is a very flexible concept.328 It is difficult to 
see why such a flexible concept could burden the executive. We noted in chapter two that the 
concept of a hearing may vary from a simple written presentations to a full blown hearing 
with oral submissions.  There is no justifiable reason, therefore, to say that under no 
circumstance will procedural fairness be imposed on executive action. This argument entails 
that even the simplest forms of presentations like a written submission are unacceptable 
under legality. PAJA itself states that for administrative actions, what is fair will depend on 
circumstances.329 The argument that dismisses procedural fairness in totality, therefore, does 
not take into consideration the flexibility of procedural fairness. 
 
Another argument for the adoption of procedural fairness concerns the Constitutional Court 
ready acceptance of rationality as a requirement under legality. Having looked at the trend 
that the Court is adopting in relation to legality, it can be seen that rationality is a well-
established requirement for the rule of law.330  Rationality encompasses procedural and 
substantive aspects of legality, while procedural fairness is only a form of procedural legality. 
This means, therefore, that rationality imposes on the public officials more onerous demands 
than procedural fairness. Rationality is closer to substantive requirements like reasonableness 
which have the capacity to disrupt the separation of powers. It is difficult to understand, 
therefore, why the more substantive requirement of rationality is accepted as a constraint for 
executive while the merely formal requirement of procedural fairness is not.  
 
In addition, Hoexter states that it can be argued that rationality will always demand 
procedural fairness and that the application of procedural fairness will depend on 
circumstances. Hoexter finds it difficult to conceive of a situation where the rationality of a 
                                                          
328 See J Raz ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 LQR 195 201 and C Hoexter ‘The principle of legality 
in South African administrative law’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 165. 
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decision would not be enhanced by hearing both sides.331 Her argument, therefore, is that 
whenever rationality is in question, hearing both sides has the effect of affecting the 
rationality of decisions in all cases. Our argument is that if rationality is an established 
principle under legality then at least procedural fairness should also be established as a part of 
the principle of rationality. The argument that procedural fairness can never find space under 
legality then becomes redundant. 
 
There are also some commentators who have submitted theoretical arguments for the support 
of procedural fairness in the exercise of public power. They argue that procedural fairness has 
always been used as a mechanism to control the exercise of power. After all it is a part of the 
rule of law. For example, Hoexter states that it cannot be justifiable to dismiss anyone 
without a hearing.332 She is backed by Rawls who states that in some instances there is no 
other way or criteria to distinguish a just outcome except the procedure that has been used.333 
All is buttressed by Raz who acknowledges that ‘the principle of fairness is inherent in the 
obligations of the rule of law’ thus it is a component of the rule of law.334 
 
Forsyth and Wade also state that no matter how wide the powers a public functionary are the 
administrator is still expected to act in a manner that is procedurally fair. They state further 
that ‘[a]s governmental powers grow more drastic, it is only by procedural fairness that they 
are rendered tolerable’.335 The argument goes even further that even where substantive laws 
are unfair or even unjust they are tolerable to the extent that they are procedurally fair.336 
Jackson J in the same breadth concluded that ‘procedural fairness and regularity are of 
indispensable essence to liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and 
impartially applied’.337 
 
Although there is general agreement that the imposition of procedural requirements has the 
effect of impeding or being an obstacle to the smooth running of government it has been 
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upheld for its ability to give decisions of a better quality.338 Kelly explains justice as the 
correct decision as being seen from the point of view of those affected by the decision.339 He 
found that in the early ages the Greek and the Romans found it best to hear the other side 
because the chances of making a mistake were higher. This was because, generally, human 
beings enjoy hearing the accusation rather than the defence so hearing both sides would assist 
judges in being unbiased.340 We can note hear that the hearing rule is even protruding into 
judicial impartiality and as such it can have the same effect if applied in executive actions. 
This means that the executive functionary will not be impartial towards the information at his 
disposal which excludes that of the affected party if there is no hearing. 
 
Furthermore Raz puts the observance of principles of natural justice as important principles 
to the rule  of law he says that ‘[o]pen and fair hearing, absence of bias and the like are 
obviously essential for the correct application of the law and thus ... to its ability to guide 
action’.341 Raz defends the application of procedural fairness under legality because at least 
the court has the opportunity to decide what content of fairness is required in each given case 
thus he is against the all or nothing approach.342 
 
5.4 Is the Constitutional Court’s Approach consistent with the separation of powers? 
In considering consistence with the separation of powers we shall examine the 
constitutionality of the first and second stage. On the third approach we notice that the 
Constitutional Court has pointed that it is willing to accept full-blown procedural fairness but 
has not yet accepted it. As such we have already looked at the arguments for and against such 
an approach. Under this heading therefore we will dwell more on analysing the first two 
approaches. 
 
The first approach that has been adopted in the Masetlha and ARMSA has been criticised for 
putting the law back 20 years. This is according to Hoexter who when she was commenting 
on the majority decision of Masetlha said that the decision that procedural fairness cannot be 
imposed on the executive seems retrogressive.343  Hoexter’s position anchors on two fronts: 
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First, being that it is inconceivable to think how affording Mr Masetlha a hearing would have 
jeopardised state security. Second, that in Zenzile the court required that there should be a 
hearing. It boggled her mind why in a constitutional dispensation built on principles of 
accountability, the Constitutional Court would find a hearing to be a non-event.344 It means 
that according to this approach the content of procedural fairness is even less than it was in 
the old regime.345 
 
The shallow reasoning of the Masetlha case has led some commentators to say that the 
decision of Masetlha legality is ‘clearly wrong’.346 Some have been more lenient and said 
that at least the Court should have taken Masetlha to be an exception rather than the rule.347 
The argument goes that adopting Masetlha is an outright erosion of the right to be heard. At 
least the Court could have stated that Masetlha was exceptional considering the context 
specific nature of protecting national security.348 
 
Kruger warns that Masetlha should not be read as precedent or as the general rule. She states 
that ‘if not read in context and with care’ it could ‘set a perilous precedent reducing the 
constraints on the exercise of executive power, significantly and potentially eroding the 
supremacy of the Constitution in that respect’.349 Reducing the rather important constraints 
that judicial review for executive functions survives additionally has the effect of 
undermining the separation of powers which caters for checks and balances.   
 
Perhaps the second approach illustrated better the unconstitutionality of the first approach and 
its impermissibility as an approach to be taken seriously. Besides the first approach being too 
strict the Constitutional Court softened in its second approach. In the Albutt case, for 
example, the Court adopted the approach that the decision of the President to pardon convicts 
of politically motivated crimes needed to be rational. The Court found that for the President 
to be able to meet the goals for which the dispensation was being carried, he needed to hear 
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the families of the victims. In the end the Court imposed an obligation of procedural fairness 
on the President because it would make the decision rational. Procedural fairness at this stage 
is not taken to be a requirement not simply because it enhanced rationality, but also because it 
is the only way to meet the government purpose. For example, in the Albutt case it was the 
only way to meet the purpose of national unity and peace building. 
 
Albutt and the Democratic Alliance cases, therefore, stand in tension with Masetlha and 
ARMSA whose judgments dismiss even the possibility of demanding procedural fairness for 
executive action. The first approach was so radical even though Hoexter says that it is 
difficult to think of cases whose rationality would not be enhanced by hearing the other 
side.350 Hoexter’s sentiment, therefore, is that the radical stance of the Constitutional Court in 
the first approach is not reasonable as it was an outright expulsion of the right to be heard 
when executive action is involved. Although Albutt did not overrule Masetlha,351 Masetlha 
remains a cause for concern.352 
 
In summary, we note that it is clear that the first approach was clearly out of touch with 
principles of the separation of powers. With the second approach the Constitutional Court had 
a little more respect for the separation of powers. However, it is very disappointing that the 
judgment of the Court illustrated wasted opportunity to clear up issues. So far the Court is 
considering the separation of powers and it is encouraging. 
 
5.5 Which approach is better for SA’s system of the separation of powers? 
 
The approach that best suits South Africa is the one that best suits South Africa’s system of 
the separation of powers which in itself is a difficult question to answer. The difficulty is 
enhanced by the fact that the Constitutional Court itself has not developed a coherent theory 
for the separation of powers. The Court has dealt with the separation of powers mainly on a 
case by case basis.  
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South Africa’s system of the separation of powers is a hybrid system. It allows intrusion of 
the judicial powers into the powers of the executive through the principle of judicial review. 
Because there is no fixed rigid doctrine of the separation of powers353 it is not defendable to 
act as if separation of powers does not allow overlap of powers at all. As such Cachalia’s 
argument is relevant, that the South Africa form of separation of powers is not primarily 
concerned with the rigid fragmentation of government power but the exercise of an 
appropriate degree of judicial control.354 The unique formulation of the doctrine therefore 
allows for separation of powers to be dealt with in a context sensitive manner that caters for 
the flexibility of procedural fairness.355 Ngcobo states that there is need to sustain public 
confidence in the judiciary, so we need to understand the cooperation rather than competition 
nature of the separation of powers.356  In the end to out rightly exclude procedural fairness for 
the fear of upsetting separation of powers seems jurisprudentially untenable because each 
case has to be delay with uniquely to see how the doctrine can be applied.  
 
With our version of the rule of law, the question is not of whether the courts should intervene 
or not for fear of upsetting the separation of powers but how the courts will manoeuvre the 
question of separation of powers in each case. To this end there should be reviewability for 
procedural fairness in which questions of the separation of powers will be discussed 
depending on the circumstances of the case. 
 
Having established this background it seems there is a lot of support for the position that 
executive powers should be constrained by obligations of procedural fairness. On the 
backdrop of apartheid power was removed from the political branches and vested in the 
judiciary, chapter nine institutions and civil society.357 Procedural fairness minimises 
arbitrariness and thus has the consequence to promote the rule of law.358  
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Procedural fairness is a firm requirement that should not be taken lightly.359 Ngcobo J says 
that all the other reasons for not adopting procedural obligations for the exercise of executive 
actions so far are not enough, for example the trust relationship given in Masetlha. He argues 
that the case by case application approach is even better as it respects the supremacy of the 
Constitution and, consequently, the importance of the rule of law.360 
 
Countering the argument that procedural requirements may be too imposing on the executive. 
Klare states that there is need to consider that the Constitution was written as a response to 
the political history of South Africa.361 Here the non-arbitrariness argument of Ncgobo J who 
states that fundamental fairness is linked to the non-arbitrary exercise of power is 
important.362 The argument goes that the rule of law is linked to the other foundational values 
of accountability, openness and responsibility whereby adherence to these seems impossible 
without participation in decision making.363 Murcott takes the argument further and argues 
that the new constitutional dispensation envisages participatory democracy in which ‘the 
right to speak and be listened to is part of the right to be a citizen in the full sense of the word 
. . . and the right to have a voice on public affairs is constitutive of dignity’.364 
 
In summary, the separation of powers doctrine of South Africa involves both formal and 
substantive requirements. Considering the importance of judicial review for procedural 
fairness it should be rejected that procedural fairness has no place in legality. However, it 
cannot be denied that the requirement is onerous. As such the Constitutional Court should 
adopt a case by case approach, which tallies with the way that the Court has adopted the 
separation of powers doctrine that it applies on a case by case basis. We found also that 
judicial review is the rule of law in action. At the same time we found that the rule of l aw 
‘enforces minimum standards of farness both substantive and procedural’.365 The Masethla 
stance is a perilous stance with the danger of eroding the supremacy of the Constitution.  
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Even some of the theoretical arguments apply in South Africa where Ngcobo J stated that ‘[a] 
hearing can convert a case that was considered to be shut to be open to some doubt, and a 
case that was considered to be inexplicable to be fully explained’.366 The argument goes that 
had Masetlha been given a hearing the misunderstanding that made the special relationship 




Considering the Constitutional Court has no real and established approach yet, we will make 
some recommendations that can assist the Court in the future. 
 
The most important recommendation is that the Constitutional Court in cases where they 
want to apply principles of procedure fairness should not avoid the PAJA. Albutt was a clear 
case and example of where the Court avoided the PAJA.368 Murcott argues that finding out 
whether pardoning powers were administrative or not would have had an influence on the 
applicability of procedural fairness or the standard of procedural fairness demanded.369 
 
Although the Constitutional Court now appears to be willing to accept procedural fairness for 
the exercise of executive power, nothing has been said about the nature of the hearing that 
will be required. Murcott argues that the PAJA would have helped ease everything.370 This is 
with the consideration that nothing was said by the Court on the nature or content of hearing 
that had to be followed under the rule of law.371 
 
The submission, therefore, is that at least there is certainty in the PAJA so the courts should 
be hesitant to avoid it. Murcott states that sound judicial reasoning is that the legality should 
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be a backstop after considering the PAJA.372 She states that the tendency of the Constitutional 
Court is not avoidance of the PAJA but failure to apply the PAJA which in the end belittles 
the importance of the PAJA.373 By refusing to apply the PAJA the Court failed to decide 
whether it is desirable, necessary or possible to apply the rights that the PAJA protects.374 
 
The recommendation, therefore, is that the Constitutional Court should at least first inquire 
into the applicability of the PAJA and leave the PAJA to set a guideline on what procedural 
fairness demands. Mthiyane JA states in this regard that ‘[a] litigant cannot avoid the 
provisions of PAJA by going behind it, and seeking to rely on section 33(1) of the 
Constitution or the common law. That would defeat the purpose of the Constitution in 
requiring the rights contained in section 33 to be given effect by means of national 
legislation’.375  
 
Further, we recommend and upheld the ‘yes to procedural rationality’ approach whilst 
holding that the ‘no to procedural farness’ approach should be discarded. This is because, 
besides the respect that the ‘yes to procedural rationality’ gives to the executive, it has the 
capacity to be developed taking into account the interests of the parties in each case. The two 
other approaches are too extreme; they lead to a generalisation, an all or nothing approach 
which stamps out individuality and situational differences.376 The ‘yes to procedural 
rationality’ approach respects the dignity of the people that are affected by the executive and 
it resembles what Mashaw called the Dignitary Theory.377  
 
This dignitary approach, Mashaw states, offers constitutional consistency because it echoes 
rights (substantive procedures) where the rights that are in the Constitution are affected by the 
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decision.378 For example in the Albutt the individuals’ right to be heard was iterated, and 
provided for with the respect of cause to the powers conferred on the executive 
 
As a result of the dignitary theory, Mashaw suggests an approach which states that that the 
‘effects of process on participants, not just the rationality of substantive results, must be 
considered in judging the legitimacy of public decision making’.379 He goes on to state that 
intuitively, process is important to us regardless of what the outcome is.380 This means that as 
far as fairness is concerned there is a need to distinguish between result oriented arguments 
and process based ones.381 Thibaut and Walker in their experimental work found that people 
have a tendency to involve themselves in decision making processes to gauge the fairness of 
the processes thus trying to protect substantive concerns through the afforded opportunity 
given for personal strategy.382 
 
In a sense, therefore, people do not associate losing with being treated unfairly but unfairness 
will be associated with not being taken seriously as an individual.383  In a sense the Court in 
Paul v. Davis384 made the same point when it stated the following: ‘I have always thought 
that one of this Court's most important roles is to [protect] the legitimate expectations of 
every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.’ The issue according to the theory 
‘is . . . whether the challenged process sustains or diminishes individual dignity’.385 
 
This recommendation entails, therefore, that procedural rationality is the way to go since it 
protects both the process values and the substantive values that a fair procedure seeks to 
advance. So in the end even though the Constitutional Court may not want to disregard 
Masetlha or follow Motau, to accept full procedural rationality is sustainable. Considering it 
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is minimum threshold for the exercise of all public power more requirements could be added 
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